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PRESIDIUM MEMBER KEMPNY ON ECONOMIC POLICY

Prague NOVA MYSL in Czech No 2, Jan 81 pp 3-18

[Article by Josef Kemny, member of the presidium and secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee: "Implementing the Economic Policy of the Party With Resolution"]

[Text] This is the period of final preparations for the 16th CPCZ Congress at which the party will evaluate the fulfillment of its program policies, and based on an analysis of the needs of social development and our capacities, will set realistic goals for the future period of building a developed socialist society.

The overall course of the precongress preparations enables us to state that the conclusions of the congress will further the creative development of the general policies of the 14th and 15th party congresses--the building of a mature socialist society. The correctness of this general policy is fully confirmed by our social system and our experiences which are consistent with the developments and experiences of our fraternal communist parties. As stated by Comrade Gustav Husak at the 18th session of the CPCZ Central Committee, this policy correctly expresses the national and international interests of the Czechoslovak people and provides a scientifically substantiated response to the development of our society as a revolutionary achievement of the laboring class and all workers, as an integral part of the world struggle for socialism, peace and social progress.

This social and international mission of our overall policy also applies to our economic policy with its strategic program of increasing the efficiency of the national economy by means of intensification and better quality of all work. Economic policy occupies a special place and plays a key role in the whole system of political relations and activities, is closely linked with the economic base of society and has the strongest active influence on it. Therefore, as stated in Lenin's words, "Our chief policy must be...the economic buildup of the state..."

The Central Committee of our communist party is consistently guided by this principle. In the period since the 15th CPCZ Congress, the economic strength of our republic has been consolidated. We have continued to develop a more , mature economy and have produced a material-technical base adequate for a developed socialist society. The fact that the national income increased by 21.6 percent and industrial production was over one-fourth higher in 1980 than at the end of the Fifth Five-Year Plan sufficiently demonstrates the dynamic development of our national economy. This in itself was a very challenging job and, moreover, we were

forced to carry it out under unprecedently difficult domestic and foreign economic conditions. Nevertheless, the laboring class and all the working people, under the leadership of the party, achieved a number of new successes. We consider the gradual implementation of structural changes directed toward the growth of long-range sectors to be especially important. The greatest increment of energy capacities in our history was achieved, the production of nuclear energy was developed and the modern development of the electronics industry was established. We further consolidated the social security of our people and improved their living conditions on the basis of the development of the national economy.

The fact that we rightly expect of the 16th CPCE Congress a confirmation of the strategic policy of increased efficiency of the national economy through its intensification does not mean that we can expect nothing new or unusually challenging in our economic life. On the contrary, it is precisely the necessity for a resolute and rapid turn to intensification that will require substantially higher standards on all levels of management, all state and economic bodies, improvement of political leadership by party agencies and intensification of the initiative and creative work of all working collectives. The difficulty of this process increases to the extent that we have failed to bring to life the congress' strategic directive in individual branches and sectors and to the extent that problems with negative impacts on all of society persist and insofar as this persistence gives rise to new problems of a societywide character. Contrary to the time when a rapid growth rate of the national income was achieved primarily by extensive methods through the growth of the net national production and product consumption, today we have to achieve increased national income through intensive utilization of existing resources. The difficulties and challenges are also growing because, in view of the state of the economy and trends in future developments of foreign economic conditions, we can no longer postpone the turn to very intensive development, nor can we spread it out over a longer period of time but rather we must accomplish it resolutely and rapidly. These are tasks which often have no comparison with those of the preceding period of socialist construction but their realization is a general and urgent necessity.

The basic reason for the need to turn to an intensive type of economic development is not only that the possibilities for extensive growth are exhausted, since these tendencies began to surface in our economy even in the second half of the fifties and since this type of social replacement has today reached its limits, but also because of the very essence of building developed socialism. To further persist in extensive methods of economic growth means to hamper and seriously damage our economy and consequently societywide development as well, and to stand in the way of pursuing the natural laws of this stage of developed socialism. This corresponds to a high level of the economy and better utilization of production and social resources, raising the useful qualities and properties of products and better management of human labor. The difference between extensive and intensive management is not that today, just as in past development of the socialist economy, we are not placing emphasis on the productivity of human labor, on reducing the labor input and increasing the productivity per worker. It continues to be extremely important that from every hour of human labor expended, from every kilowatt hour of electricity, or, simply put, from every unit of a productive resource, we manage to obtain ever more usable value. However, the essence of intensive development

ies in our obtaining the maximum of final net economic results, especially high formation of national income and, on this basis, raising the people's living standard essentially with existing product consumption, with existing sources of energy, raw materials and supplies, and manpower. This can be achieved by developing the creative forces of the laboring class and other workers, by accelerating scientific-technical progress and converting it into the scientific-technical revolution, by intensifying socialist economic integration, by improving the quality of programmed management and by an overall increase in the social productivity of labor.

While the growth of labor productivity in a period of extensive development is a process in which one worker is able to process more and more raw materials and supplies, in intensification the productivity of human labor is a process in which the workers, with a smaller growth of traditional energy sources, produce ever greater quantities of changing products with more useful properties. Thus, the dominating resource, is a progressive change in products, meaning product innovation in which improving technology is even more demanding because of the increased amount of product innovation which must be mastered both technologically and in time. Progressive product innovations are much more potent sources of savings in material, energy and labor resources than simple economies achieved by efforts to raise the level of aging and obsolete production. Without a goal-oriented process of product innovation, without more and better product innovation and mainly without a rapid expansion of the production of new products with improved technology, we will not be able to assure the required increases in value and best possible application of our material and labor resources.

In the innovative process based on scientific-technical advances, more profound and fundamental changes are constantly and rapidly being introduced in the designing of products, whether it be raw materials, semifinished articles and components needed for the production of finished goods or capital assets and consumer goods. Products are being substantially reduced in size, are more reliable, perform better and have other useful parameters. New branches and sectors of science and production are appearing and growing, such as nuclear energy, micro- and opto-electronics, microbiology, gene engineering, etc., offering unprecedented possibilities for the utilization and better application of all labor, energy and raw material resources and offering new resources for the development of production and society in general.

The development of innovation, economy and efficiency of production, the degree to which we best use raw materials, supplies and energy, our effectiveness on foreign markets and in satisfying our domestic needs, all these are directly dependent on the quality of scientific-technical development of production and on the introduction of advanced structural changes. Only the broad development and application of science and technology in production will help us solve our greatest problems in the shortage of labor, in high manufacturing consumption and low innovative effectiveness. Only on this basis can we effectively increase our share of the international division of labor and intensify socialist economic integration.

The highest social good lies in specifically directing the activity of our scientific research base to implement the scientific-technical revolution. Thus it is not simply a matter of increasing scientific research and development activity but rather the final efficacy of this work for society. In the meantime, however,

our scientific, research and development base does not, in spite of its considerable achievements, have a corresponding share in the scientific technical progress of production and manufactured products and for this reason, also, scientific progress in production and products is thus far proceeding much more slowly than is required for building developed socialism. The other side of this problem is represented by an active approach to science, using it to solve practical problems and the speed with which the results are put into practice.

The requirement to accelerate scientific-technical progress places new, higher demands on the quality of management of both science and production, all the more so since all aspects of the required turn to the intensification of our economy are concentrated in the area of programmed management. Efforts to improve the quality of management must originate in the objectives of the plan and the state plan for development of the national economy and economic plans at all levels must definitely be founded on plans of scientific-technical development. The plan for scientific-technical development must become an integral part, and literally the backbone, of the state plan. Scientific-technical development must be the chief thrust of all parts of the plan and especially the production plan and must support all aspects of its implementation. We must see to it that the obligation to achieve scientific-technical goals is given top priority and is strictly controlled. At both national and lower economic levels there must be a clear concept of future development of production on the basis of scientific-technical development and the goals and focus of key guidelines of the innovative process must be clearly designated so that these guidelines are converted into practical forms of goal-oriented programs as prescribed in the shape of state goal-oriented programs on the level of central management and, further, that they are identified as being among the key tasks of scientific-technical development on the VNIJ [economic production unit] and enterprise level. Efforts must be made to see that goal-oriented programs of whatever order involve the best possible preparations for and execution of specific comprehensive innovative actions and encompass phases of research and development preparation as well as investment phases and phases for starting new production. State goal-oriented programs will carry out their mission better to the extent that their preparations are closely linked to the needs of our economy and to the extent that they orient the process of intensification and restructuring to conform with long-term concepts.

The specific contributions of state goal-oriented programs, basic central and enterprise measures to reduce manufacturing consumption chiefly through better use of energy and raw materials, procedures to limit inefficient production and to shift operations to products in which we match world standards or even exceed them, these all should be apparent from the beginning of the implementation of the Seventh Five-Year Plan. In addition to system measures, it is necessary, especially in the system of planned management, to make substantially broader use of well-thought-out, economically justified measures in the interests of overcoming conservatism in the work of VNIs, enterprises and ministries, a conservatism which as a rule results from placing group interests above the interests of society, at large.

The essence of the struggle for efficiency on an intensive basis must be greater growth of the national income than of the new social product. We can no longer allow ourselves to appeal to an understanding of general needs and wait to see how

it all comes out. Fulfilling the task of achieving maximum development and use of the national income with the lowest possible consumption must become our main concern and the criterion for activity of our state economic management and be the subject of sustained party and state guidance and control. It is precisely in key areas of social interest that we must consistently follow Lenin's precept that, "socialism means building a centralized economy, an economy controlled from the center...."

Centrally planned management on principles of democratic centralism is necessary because of our domestic needs and also the need to consolidate socialist economic integration. It is essential to strengthen the active influence of the state plan while implementing higher forms of integrating activity and while carrying out long-term concepts of linking the Czechoslovak economy with the socialist co-operation of the CMEA member states. Ever closer cooperation in planning is becoming the main guideline for consolidating long-term and stable productive and scientific-technical relations among our countries. We proceed from the theory, confirmed in practice, that developed socialism will be produced and can be produced only through the process of an integrated organism of the socialist community, that then any further building of socialism becomes an ever more integrated international development of the whole socialist system. That is precisely why this integration is not to be considered as a mere coordination of plans and contractual alliances chiefly by means of foreign trade but rather as a qualitatively higher level of mutual economic integration, especially on the basis of cooperation and specialization as regards technological integration.

It is especially in this direction that our cooperation with the Soviet Union is aiming, a program of specialization and cooperation and coordination of plans for the years 1981-1985, which, through its concept and specifically agreed upon provisions offers our economy excellent new opportunities to link up with the powerful drive of the Soviet economy at the top level of world scientific-technology and thus attain the highest ultimate social efficiency. Economic and scientific-technical cooperation with the Soviet Union will bring about a multiplication of our forces in the development and utilization of all sources of intensification and its influence on the efficient production of the national income and by expanding the creativity of the workers gives our economy long-term stability and future prospects. The Central Committee of our party indicated that continuing intensification of universal economic and scientific-technical cooperation with the Soviet Union and expanding cooperation with the other countries of the socialist community are essential to our future economic development. This cooperation is an effective tool for the development of our economy and with its help we will resist the unfavorable impacts of deteriorating general conditions, with it our economy will expand and we must take it into account even into the future. It is only through the support of socialist economic integration that we can deal effectively with our economic relations with nonsocialist countries.

We will be meeting the goals of the development of our national economy under worsened conditions of external economic relations. This is an objective reality and we cannot ignore it, especially since we have already experienced the unfavorable effects of foreign influences in the Sixth Five-Year Plan, when the impact of higher import prices represented about Kcs 60 billion. We were unable to meet these increased import prices by increasing our exports. We must appreciate all

the more the protection from literally tragic consequences that our membership in CMEA provided and especially the fact that we are procuring fuel and raw materials from the USSR at substantially lower cost. For example, during the Seventh Five-Year Plan we will be getting petroleum from the Soviet Union for a price which is substantially lower compared with current prices from nonsocialist countries. And we have no way of knowing when and by how much the cost of petroleum on these markets will further change. The fact that in the coming 5-year period we will be buying from the Soviet Union for prices that correspond to the average of world prices in the last 5 years gives us a certain confidence. These advantages, however, do not lessen the need for substantially reducing our manufacturing consumption. On the contrary, there is perhaps no problem for which it is so urgent to achieve a real turnaround as precisely the matter of reducing manufacturing consumption.

As a processing nation we are and constantly will be dependent on imports of raw material and energy resources and obtaining them will be more and more costly and difficult. We must understand, in all its ramifications, this great dependency of Czechoslovakia on foreign economic relations: we never have and never will be immune to movements of world economies.

It is, therefore, proper and necessary that we take concrete measures, as, for example, the decision on counterimport policies, all the more so since a considerable proportion of our imports are uneconomic and it is not a rare case for enterprises and VMEs to waste foreign exchange on useless imports and goods not fully justifiable. The set of counterimport measures taken by the government must be consistently and responsibly implemented to achieve more efficient assessment of raw materials, full utilization of all imports and to restrict imports and exports that are at variance with the guidelines. The single and actual source of needed foreign exchange is, however, the efficient exportation of products of our processing industry, especially engineering.

We must be all means take a lesson from the fact that our economy was not able to fully cover the increased cost of basic import receipts by increasing its export efficiency, in spite of the fact that a 1974 resolution of the November plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee warned that deteriorating foreign conditions were becoming permanent factors and that the focus of these problems was shifting into the economy. This session of the CPCZ Central Committee early pointed out the main ways to overcome the consequences of changes in external conditions of foreign exchange, although these conclusions were not consistently carried out in the economic sphere. Drops in engineering exports especially and additional imports for the agricultural and food complex led to a worse development of the trade balance than had been expected in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. Some of this deterioration had to be taken care of by foreign credits. Contrary to original expectations, the trade credits provided by us also increased, thus leading to a postponement of collections and the need for temporary compensation through foreign sources. However, we must clearly see that the problems of our foreign-exchange situation are not in the current state of our assets and liabilities but primarily in the developing trends, in the fact that we must expect further rapid increased demands on the technical-economic standards of products sold on world markets.

This calls for having the necessary amount of export-goods inventory capable of meeting the competition. Consequently, we must consider much more carefully how to direct future development in the area of investment policy so that, even with relatively smaller investment resources, we can achieve higher national economic efficiency and so that the export capability of our economy may grow more rapidly by preferential development of those branches in which we have the prerequisites for making the best use of our domestic raw materials and fully utilizing the high qualifications, skills and creative abilities of our workers.

This, however, places greater demands and more responsibilities on the production sphere to achieve those parameters, cost factors of production and productivity of labor which would be comparable with world standards. To this end, it is necessary for production representatives, designers, technicians and planners to monitor world developments and especially innovative moves, in order to learn more about their foreign competitors and their intentions than heretofore. At the same time, it is necessary for economic instruments to react more flexibly to the rapid movement of exchange relations abroad in order, with their help, to raise the responsibility of the production sphere toward positive, long-term, balanced development of our foreign economic relations.

In connection with the problem complex of external economic relations it is necessary, however, to emphasize that, together with the need for further improvement of our foreign-trade activity, the high competitive quality of our products on the world markets must be based above all on research and production. Foreign exchange, which in our circumstances is extremely important, is an essential means for expanding our productive capability and satisfying the development needs of our society.

In all of this, our engineering and electronics industry is of particular importance. Here is where the decisions are made about advanced production technology in all the other branches, about the quality and variety of a good portion of consumer goods and about our standing in socialist economic integration and on foreign markets. Substantially increasing the intensity of production innovations in the engineering and electronics industry is, from the standpoint of intensification of our entire economy as well as our external economic relations, the key question of the whole upcoming five-year plan. So it is essential to see the necessity for the rapid development of electronics and microelectronics which in the last two decades have attained a really remarkable position in the world. They are penetrating more and more into all areas of human activity, from industry all the way to health, education and culture. They determine the technical-economic standards of industrial products, advance their functional parameters, performance and reliability and method of servicing. They significantly influence the defense capability of countries and penetrate ever more deeply into the socioeconomic fabric of society. They are developing at an extremely rapid innovative pace and their utilization is becoming one of the important measures of the maturity and technical-economic level of industrially developed countries and a key factor in the dynamism of future economic development. The use of lithography opened the way to further miniaturization and further intensification of production procedures by combining part of the assembly operations with those of production.

It is every more apparent that without electronic controls engineering equipment becomes less efficient, impedes the development of the economy and is unsalable on world markets. Electronic converters in driving mechanisms and other applications

save in hundreds of thousands of tons of standard fuel. In industry and agriculture, in construction as well as in transportation, there appear more and more microelectronic controls for machinery and processes which save thousands of workers, hundreds of thousands of tons of material and fuel, and millions of korunas in actual expenditures. In the last years of the Sixth Five-Year Plan our central agencies passed a number of resolutions on energy to accelerate the development of microelectronics. At the present time, numbers of microelectronic components needed for microprocessing controls and for other electronic applications have been or will be put into production. Essential agreements were drawn up on international cooperation and the reciprocal delivery of these components. A state goal-oriented program, "Electronica," was prepared and is oriented toward further development and broader provision of electronic components for the national economy.

The Czechoslovak electrical engineering industry prepared a broad concept of its development in the seventh and eighth five-year plans, the main purpose of which is to catch up with world leadership in components for microelectronics in the near future. We are starting up a highly demanding technology for the production of integrated circuits for extensive integration of the MOS model. According to the concept adopted, all the main groups of electrotechnical and electronic products will be of an innovative nature. In the course of the Seventh Five-Year Plan a new line of electronic computers of our make will be put on the domestic market. In the sector of investment electronics, new private branch telephone exchanges of the third-and-one-half generation will be delivered as will new types of radar and new products for medical technology and high-voltage electrical engineering. Consumer electronics will be enriched by television receivers with "inline" color tubes, new models of radios, tape recorders, phonographs, etc.

The required volume of technological equipment cannot be obtained only through licensing and purchases from abroad. We will have to design and produce a considerable portion of it ourselves, using our own resources and the skills of our own people. The qualification structure of workers in science, research, development and production will have to be adapted to new directions and goals. We must expect that microtechnology will continue to develop in the world. Consequently, we must also take the lead in science, research and development. The expansion of electronics and microelectronics must become here, as everywhere else in industrially developed countries, the main intensification factor in the development of our economy.

Capital construction, which for a long time has been predetermining the way for further economic development, must also share the responsibility here. That, however, is still one of the weakest points in implementing our economic policies. Although the 15th CPCZ Congress very emphatically showed that a change in the structure of investments in favor of modernization and remodeling must be our main guideline, pressure persists for new construction and there are excessive demands for the import of machinery and equipment. This increases claims to cover the balance of payments abroad. In addition, it was again stated at the 18th session of the Central Committee that the management of our fixed assets is continuing to deteriorate, which is actually proof of our continuing "extensive" management and also proof of the access of ministries, MHS and enterprises to the strategic program of our economic policies. Making poor use of our fixed assets is evidence of the irresponsible waste of our national wealth and resources, which belong to all of society. In the past, we have put a good portion of our created national income into current fixed assets and therefore we are justified in asking that these assets contribute more

significantly to maintaining our high living standard and its continued growth. Poor utilization of fixed production assets in terms of time and capacity and the ever growing discrepancy between their replacement and the replacement of labor are showing up in the relative shortages of manpower and in reduced use of shift work. But the worst of it is that the excessively high dynamics of investment activity with failure to assign a higher proportion to modernization and remodeling work results in requirements for more fuel, energy and raw material resources.

All this, together with the long-lasting deficiencies in capital construction, such as failure to start up facility operations on time and with planned parameters, excessive unfinished construction and the growth of investment costs, cause great losses to the national economy, particularly since every delay has a chain reaction in supplier-consumer relations with an unfavorable impact on supplying both the domestic market and exports as well as the fact that we have to import essential products mostly for hard currency.

In the Seventh Five-Year Plan, we must all resolutely enforce the requirement that the whole system of managing units under construction be placed into the investment plan and that the whole course of capital construction be strictly regulated by it to achieve consistent integration with enterprise plans and substantially raise the responsibility of participants in construction for the results of investment work. Central bodies and sectors are not to allow the growth of investment costs as a matter of course, all the more so since investigation shows that to a considerable extent they are arrived at precisely by subjective underestimating of the economic aspects of efficiency, inconsistency and irreversibility toward societywide interests. Many projects were built less economically than was possible under our conditions because the narrow personal interests of the suppliers were against cheaper, less substantial designs.

Long-term experience shows that thorough preinvestment preparation of projects is a basic requirement for efficiency of construction, during the course of construction and completion by the stipulated deadline. Consequently, among the foremost tasks of our efforts to increase efficiency in the Seventh Five-Year Plan is the substantial upgrading of the entire process of capital construction by a marked improvement in the procedures, methods of management and coordination of all participants in capital construction, control of the whole cycle of planning preparation and execution of construction and concentrating our forces on completing projects and starting up facilities within the planned and designed parameters. For management of the national economy as well as the whole area of capital construction, it holds true that chiefly by means of the plan and improved planning it is possible for us to overcome our problems, unite the efforts of the people and mobilize our material and financial resources, and this applies perhaps doubly to capital construction.

New elements of the system of programmed management can be implemented only in connection with the material content of the plan. The purpose of our efforts, after all, is not only to improve the system of management but rather the systematic development of the national economy and more fully satisfying the growing needs of the people. The Set of Measures for Improving the Planned Management System of the National Economy must operate in favor of the plan, on the one hand, to help enforce and carry out the state plan as a law and, on the

other goal, to be an effective tool for mobilizing the initiative of the workers. Development of the management system has two interconnected, mutually dependent and supportive aspects: the state plan and enterprise khorraschet with the tool of monetary incentive. With increasing degrees of complexity and the growing effect of scientific-technical advances, the counterplan assumes increasing importance, collectively expressing the contribution of working teams toward developing central economic policies in individual enterprises. This is an important economic and political goal. Let us have no illusions that all management personnel and collective workers already understand the implementation of the Set of Measures in this sense. It is not simply that the economic thinking of people cannot be changed from one day to the next. The greatest danger is represented by those for whom a new arrangement does not fit into their established pattern of engagement, for whom increased challenges and responsibilities for assets entrusted to them and meeting society's interests conflict with their convenience, egoism and absolute dodging of responsibilities.

Liberians, we must recognize in time and proceed resolutely against tendencies toward unilateral overestimation of the market mechanism. From there it is only a small step to underestimating the role of the plan and weakening state management of the economy. These questions not only affect the area of economic theory but also practical economic policy. Making planned use of buying and selling relations is of great importance to socialism. General economic relations of socialism include wages, prices, profit, return on investments, etc but the key point is that the socialist community uses them in a planned manner.

The system of prices in its entirety has an important role in socialism by linking production and consumption in all areas of the replacement process. The wholesale price plays a role in the production sphere and is an important criterion for labor and resource input. In the Seventh Five-Year Plan we want it to stimulate even more the distribution of the results of labor among the populace, socialist enterprises and the state. We are taking measures to see that wholesale prices actively operate toward greater economy consciousness and better utilization of all society's input in the replacement process. We are continuing to try to maintain consistency between prices and socially needed labor input and, at the same time, through price formation, better express the level of the utility value of products and in domestic price formulation gradually give greater consideration to more difficult internal conditions. State wholesale prices must more clearly fulfill their function as standards and in accordance with the requirements of efficiency operate better to reduce manufacturing consumption. Consequently, one of the essential pricing procedures for the Seventh Five-Year Plan is in fact, an expression of socially essential expenditures for the acquisition and importation of raw materials in the system of wholesale prices. For example, it must be realized that the cost of refining 1 ton of coal for energy will be 59 percent higher than in the Fifth Five-Year Plan and costs of coking coal will be 38 percent higher per ton.

Socially essential costs will continue to be the basis for price formulation--otherwise we would be abandoning the platform of the Marxist labor theory of value--that, however, is not rejected; on the contrary, we expect conscientious deviation of certain prices from their value base. That is why we envision further implementation and intensification of price stimulation for technically advanced

products, products of top quality, fashion novelties and products of a luxury nature, but also price penalties for technically obsolete products and third-grade products.

Much also depends on the increasing of involvement of our economy with the international division of labor. In these relationships, the nature of the application of the price function as a measure of value, until lately determined by the amount of national labor needed for society, necessarily changes to a measure of value that is determined by international values as represented by prices on the world market. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary to collate our criteria of domestic values with the more exacting foreign point of view.

These criteria, however, also apply to the production of goods for the domestic market. People buy what they need and not what anyone wants to produce and sell without regard to their needs. Today, having achieved a high degree of satisfying people's material and cultural needs, with sustained increasing costs of production we can no longer meet society's concerns simply by the quantity of products if they are not useful. Society does not need to have any old kind of labor expended for any old kind of products but rather wants work and products of the required quality, technical standards and with useful properties. No one can eat his fill from hectares of plowed fields, but our tables are well laden with products turned out by agriculture. It is no use having lots of earth and construction work with millions and billions invested when we need buildings in which to finally produce things in designed parameters, and houses that we can live in. Here is, if we may say so, the political matter of our economic activity. Not the economic impact alone and perhaps even the effect on the producer but rather, and above all, the effect on satisfying societywide concerns is the expression of our political approach toward managing our economic development.

With the development of a mature socialist society and the rapid expansion of production capacity as a result of the scientific-technical revolution, there is increased need for management by planning with respect to its quality and scientific outlook, on the one hand, on the other hand, consolidating social forces around the state plan as the main instrument for central management whose objective is to meet society's concerns as the basis for also satisfying the interests of the individual. Thus central management does not exclude, on the contrary it expects, consistent development of the initiative of our managing components and requires that all levels of management unify the efforts of the workers toward guaranteeing implementation of the quality aspects of economic development and to raise the attention of every worker toward society's needs.

One of the critical problems in this area is to improve the quality of and consolidate the role of the normative base. This calls for higher management levels to use norms used in production organizations. This applies to performance standards as well as consumption norms. If the plan did not rely on objective technical and economic parameters, then control work might become subjective, with negative consequences for the unity of interests and initiative of the people.

In this connection, one cannot rely on Khozraschet as a self-redeeming mechanism which can compensate for a low-quality normative base through buying and selling relations and value categories. Intensifying Khozraschet relations without adequate

Interpretation of the normative base merely brings about a lack of restraint and impairs the khoraschet link with the plan. If the objective of the plan is to determine socially desirable directions and goals with the most desirable natural and material values for the economy, then the task of the khoraschet stimulation instruments is to produce conditions so that the khoraschet area can follow these directions with maximum efficiency. The development of khoraschet forms does not in any way lead to greater independence of enterprises compared to the state plan and its obligations. On the contrary, khoraschet expects consolidation of directive work assignments of programmed management from headquarters as well as increased independence in determining which are the most efficient methods of fulfilling assigned goals. Socialist society has the right and obligation to assign its production organizations specific tasks and goals to the extent that is necessary in order to provide for the needs of society and khoraschet organizations are obliged to find ways and means to guarantee implementation of these tasks using a minimum of labor, material and wage resources.

Closely tied in with khoraschet is the use of material motivation of workers for the results of their labor activity through wages. V.I. Lenin placed great emphasis on the principle of distribution: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his merits," and he demanded that socialism be built "...on the basis of personal interest, on the basis of personal motivation, on the basis of khoraschet, ..." Here, however, in many cases the amount of compensation and its growth are not tied in with specific results of work and so frequently a worker need not be responsible for the amount produced and its quality. Therefore, the development of wages also does not correspond to the development of labor productivity and, furthermore, it is not merely the fact that it is reflected in higher wage requirements for producing national income. We particularly must not overlook that fact that it is reflected in higher wage requirements for producing national income. We particularly must not overlook the fact that the growth of wages is surpassing the production of material resources and development of services and this leads to difficult problems on the domestic market. Providing the required degree of interfacing between the growth of labor productivity and the average wage must always be at the center of our attention and we must by all means prevent undesirable relations in their development.

In this connection, we must particularly change the attitude of economic managerial workers, many of whom do not have the desire to differentiate between outstanding, good, average and underaverage workers. Only thus can we make equitable and honorable wage policies at every place of work beneficial to all honest people, only in this way can the total extent of wages payable be even more closely tied to the production of national income and the growth of net labor productivity. Therefore, in the Seventh Five-Year Plan we are also strengthening the dependence of workers earnings on the production of assets so that the amount of basic wages will depend only on value added and the incentive component of wages will depend on profitability and quality. It is very important for each worker to understand this relationship because workers earnings have a critical role in satisfying their private consumption.

The development of private consumption of the population will also be affected by the extent to which the domestic market is able to secure a balance in product selection between monetary demand and the supply of goods and services. This is a basic condition for the continuous flow of cash earnings of the population. Directives for the Seventh Five-Year Plan expect this kind of balancing situation

on the domestic market in order to be able to satisfy growing consumption with a relatively lower average amount of supplies than in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. It is the key to the production of national income, to what is available for distribution and thus also for delivery to the consumer goods inventory, stabilization of the domestic market and its development consistent with the velocity of money. At the same time, the question is not merely the amount of good on the market but rather increasing and varying the supply of a desirable assortment of goods, with better technical and esthetic properties, servicing, etc.

Documentation presented at the 18th session of the Central Committee indicated extensively and very specifically the course of our increasing private and social consumption and so there is no need to repeat the widely publicized figures of this social program. It is, however, necessary to emphasize and state repeatedly that it is basic to our struggle to carry out the strategic program of our economic policy for literally every member of our working teams to fully understand that the implementation of our socio-economic programs and living standard depend on the production of assets which we create. Everyone must understand that the question of collective productivity of labor cannot be separated from the amount of resources that society will have available and consequently the kind of life each one of us will have.

The very best course of social policy and a good plan of socioeconomic development will not raise the living standard by a single percent if their implementation does not have the active support of the workers. Herein lies the immense importance of the working teams whose growing social role is linked with increased responsibility toward society for the final economic results of their work. This unity of the workers based on the division and cooperation of labor in a socialist society forms the basic social cell of our society, assists in the development of creative activity of the people and the ideological involvement of their interests with the interests and goals of all of society. Meeting the priorities of socialism calls for the activity of the people to be conscientious and ideologically informed. And since economic development is the basis for development of the other social areas and conduct of the people stimulated primarily by their economic needs and concerns, then the key to political activity of the people must lie in their participation in the implementation of economic policy in the sense of Lenin's watchword: "What is the essence of communism? All of its propaganda must be channeled so that it will lead to practical control of the building of the state."

It is important that the uniform efforts of agencies and organizations of the party, committees, Youth Union and economic workers concentrate the working initiative and socialist competition of individuals and collectives on solving the basic problems of development of the national economy and on its intensification, obtaining maximum final national-economic results from existing resources with a minimum of manufacturing consumption. They must provide full support to the development and consolidation of all forms of worker initiative among which the most valuable are the brigades of socialist labor, the comprehensive efficiency brigades and trouble-shooting teams. These teams are an expression of the creative cooperation of scientific-technical intelligentsia with the laboring class, an expression of the initiative and voluntary activity of engineers, technicians and workers and also an expression of the cultural and technical maturity of the

laboring class and its increasing share in the brainwork involved in its work. They should take the lead in taking on counterplans which make it possible for working teams and individuals in enterprises, plants and on worksites to be creatively involved with the process of formulating, implementing and supervising fulfillment of the plan. Counterplanning is based on the relationship between the five-year plan and the annual plans and to a considerable extent changes the method used up to now to formulate the annual plan. This stems from the fact that formulation of the annual plan must become the direct concern of the workers who best know the specific conditions and possibilities of their place of work. The greatest importance of counterplanning, however, is that it helps us solve the most difficult job - knowing how to overcome obstacles in ourselves, in our approaches, in persisting inertia, in tendencies toward conservatism and hanging on to traditional methods of doing things which were once tried and tested but are now outdated. In this respect we have to make considerably more demands on management components and management personnel in ministries, VHJs and other agencies, on their political, technical and ideological maturity and energy. We must see to it that responsible persons are selected for responsible jobs. He who is interested in a comfortable life cannot hold a leading position. The principle must generally apply, and even more so in personnel policies, that instead of universal proclamations of fidelity to the party and devotion to socialism, we will judge each person according to what he has actually done, how he enforces party policy at his place of work, in his surroundings and in the collective under his control.

This is a very pressing and real area of concern for party, committee and youth organizations under the present conditions of striving for efficiency and high quality in all work. Overcoming outdated habits, useless vestiges and deeprooted false notions and forming new attitudes toward work toward social concerns and goals, toward working and civic duties is an extremely complicated task. But no less revolutionary than gaining political power. Comrade Husak expressed it appropriately. "The revolutionary idea in these times is inherent above all in everyday, untiring, albeit ordinary work for the party and for our society from which the great work of socialist construction proceeds. It also consists of not compromising with defects, with anything new and progressive. It consists of socialist ownership and proletariat internationalism, in a fighting, creative and highly active approach toward implementing the policies of our party in the knowledge that through our work we are strengthening socialist society and contributing to the victory of communism all over the world."

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE, POLICY DEVELOPMENT TRACED

Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV in German Vol 12 No 3, Mar 81 (signed to press 20 Feb 80 pp 266-276

'Analyses and Reports' feature article by Gero Neugebauer: "Twenty-five Years of the National People's Army (NVA)." A translation of the Gisela Helwig article, cited in footnote 21, is published under the heading "West German Commentary on Military Instruction in GDR Schools," in JPRS 73572, 30 May 79, No 1686 of this series, pp 34-37; see also pp 38-66 of the same JPRS issue for additional items on related information)

[Text] Structure and Development

When on 18 January 1956 Willi Stoph, in addressing the GDR People's Chamber, justified the establishment of a National People's Army, he mentioned not only the obligations which arose for the GDR as a result of its joining the Warsaw Pact, but also the threat to the GDR deriving from the FRG's joining NATO and the establishment of the West German Armed Forces. The GDR's military security was not to be left to the Soviet forces alone; the GDR considered it to be its duty to make a national contribution to the defense of its borders and political and social system. This national component was not to be overestimated because, in referring to the character of the West German Armed Forces as an "imperialist mercenary army" without any national roots¹, Stoph brought out the double nature of the establishment of this army, which involved accomplishing not only national but also internationalist missions, that is to say, alliance missions.

While the other Warsaw Pact member states already had armed forces, the GDR did not have an army that could be integrated into the potential of a future treaty force. That did not mean that the NVA (National People's Army) was created from scratch. The military-policy and military-propaganda prerequisites for the buildup of armed forces had already been created prior to the founding of the GDR when, for example, the SED Politburo demanded that the German people support the Soviet Union in case of an attack by the United States also militarily². The armed forces, that had been built up in the GDR until 1955-1956 however only to a very limited degree met the requirements of a military coalition because the military protection of the SBZ (Soviet Occupation Zone) and the GDR, which was founded in October 1949, were missions exclusively for the Soviet Army. The declaration of the KVP (Garrisoned People's Police) as "national armed forces"--which took place in 1952--changed little in this situation although these formations, in terms of their organization

and attainment, already revealed the character of military units. The foreign-policy legitimization of this declaration was an attempt to integrate the FRG into the EDC (European Defense Community). The military-policy purpose was to train cadres for a future army, whereby members of the former World War II German armed forces--who had been reeducated in Soviet antifascist camps during their captivity as prisoners of war--in some ways played an important role in the leadership bodies of those national forces. But they did not attain the importance of former World War II German armed forces officers during the buildup of the West German Armed Forces.

The first NVA units were organized from the KVP units after the passage of the "Law on the National People's Army" on 18 January 1956. The first units had been set up on 1 March 1956; since then, that day has been considered the "Day of the National People's Army." In point of fact however the process of forming the army already began after the GDR joined the Warsaw Pact in May 1955. The organizational prerequisite was created by taking the main administration, responsible for the KVP, out of the Ministry of Interior⁴. The establishment of the NVA from KVP units however did not signify the transfer of KVP personnel. The personnel objectives however seemed to be attainable because a general draft was not introduced in GDR defense legislation in 1956; instead, it only became law in 1962. The absence of an automatic transfer of KVP members to the new units of the NVA furthermore presented a possibility of keeping personnel, who for various reasons had not proven themselves, away from the new army and thus, for example, forming a social and political structure among the officer corps that would correspond to the goals of the SED. Accordingly, 80 percent of the officers, 40 percent of the NCOs, and 30 percent of the enlisted men were SED members and membership applicants; 81.5 percent of the officers came from the working class and 3.1 percent came from the peasantry⁵. The intention originally was to organize an army of 120,000 men. But that decision was changed already in June 1956 and the authorized strength was reduced to 90,000 men⁶. In this way the GDR wanted to make a contribution to defusing the situation in Europe. The new personnel strength also was more in line with the personnel and materiel capabilities because difficulties came up at least when it came to getting volunteers. In general however, the buildup of the army progressed relatively briskly. The NVA units which, in contrast to other countries of the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization), were immediately placed under the high command of the armed forces, were quickly equipped with Soviet weapons and gear. The buildup and command of the units from the very beginning were guided by the decisions of the high command strictly along the lines of Soviet military-science and military-organization principles. Soviet military specialists were assigned as advisors to NVA headquarters and field units and in August 1957 the first joint maneuvers were carried out, involving units of the GSFRD (group of Soviet forces in Germany) and the NVA. In 1958, the integration of NVA units into the Warsaw Pact forces was confirmed. The first NVA buildup phase had been completed although that did not prevent any subsequent reorganization measures⁶. The integration of the NVA was speeded up by maneuvers that were carried out starting in 1961 also together with units from other Pact countries. That was connected with the intention of increasing the GDR share in the joint defense efforts in keeping with the altered military-policy and military-strategy concept of the Warsaw Pact. That applied at least to the financial aspect because Khrushchev in July 1958 announced that the Soviet Union would no longer demand that the GDR pay any of the costs arising from the stationing of Soviet troops in that country⁷. But it was more important to note

that, by virtue of the changes in the Soviet Union's military-strategy concepts, the view prevailing until 1961--to the effect that a future war would be a nuclear missile war and that the ground forces could therefore be cut back--was discarded and that instead the significance of conventional forces, especially armor, was again emphasized. The development of military technology, referred to as "revolution in military affairs," furthermore brought about qualitative changes in the training of officers and enlisted men and in the leadership of the various units. The increased valence of the NVA within the context of the Warsaw Pact forces was underscored by the inclusion of the mobile units and elements into the First Strategic Echelon of the Pact forces, completed in 1965⁸.

This increased significance of the NVA was also underlined by the Warsaw Pact maneuvers in which the NVA has been participating since 1961.

Cooperation between headquarters, as well as major and minor units of the NVA and the GSD is particularly intensive⁹.

The crash program concerned with the integration of the NVA into the Pact forces, their equipment with relatively modern Soviet weapons systems and gear, and the improved military training of army personnel--in connection with which an attempt was made to update lessons learned from military conflicts to present-day use--in the opinion of Western observers likewise brought about a situation where the NVA was developed into a modern and powerful fighting force¹⁰. The NVA's structure was basically not changed as part of the development process, nor were fundamentally new weapons systems introduced, with the exception of APCs. As at the times of its original establishment, the NVA today likewise still consists of three services. The ground forces consist of two tank and four motorized rifle divisions as well as major and minor units (artillery, missiles, AA defense, airborne units, and AT units); they constitute the largest service. The units of the Air Forces/Air Defense are equipped with fighter aircraft, fighter-bombers, helicopters, and transport aircraft as well as AA (artillery) and AA missile units and paratroopers. The smallest service is the People's Navy which has two frigates, as well as a series of missile boats, PT-boats, minesweepers and support vessels as well as landing craft. It also has a helicopter squadron.

The differing size is also expressed in the personnel strength; in 1979, the ground forces had 107,000 men, the Air Forces/Air Defense had 6,000, and the People's Navy had 16,000 men¹¹.

The organization of the NVA shows that it is not a carbon copy of the Soviet Armed Forces. It does not have any atomic weapons but it does have delivery vehicles. A quick glance at the development of its personnel strength in recent years shows how they grew during the seventies.

Development of NVA Personnel Strength (in Thousands)

1962	1964	1966	1968	1969	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978
85	106	122	126	137	129	131	145	157	159

(Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, THE MILITARY BALANCE, London, annual publication).

Defense expenditures also went up considerably¹².

Development of Defense Expenditures (in Millions of Marks)

1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	
2,820.7	2,735.0	3,200.0	5,765.0	6,733.0	7,625.0	
1974	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
8,732.5	10,233.0	7,868.0	8,261.0	8,674.0	9,403.0	10,193.0
		3,155.0	3,312.0	3,474.0	3,683.0	3,923.0

Source: K. W. Fricke, "The GDR Defense Budget," DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No 2, 1977, p 165, until 1964 computed according to actual figures, starting in 1976, based on plan figures, starting in 1977, subdivided into expenditures for national defense and expenditures for public security, law and order, and protection of the international boundary, see the following, 1976, GBL [Legal Gazette], I, 1975, No 46, p 746; for 1977, GBL, I, 1976, No 47, p 536; for 1978, GBL, I, 1977, No 37, p 419; for 1979, GBL, I, 1978, No 42, p 462; for 1980, GBL, I, 1979, No 45, p 462; for 181, ND [NEUES DEUTSCHLAND], 18 December 1980, p 8.

The NVA in the Political System

In every political system, the armed forces represent an instrument of the political leadership which is used by the latter in order to attain various objectives. These objectives can be found not only in the security-policy and military-policy but also in the domestic-policy spheres. Relations between the political and military leadership groups here constitute a special problem. That applies basically also to the NVA although in a specific manner.

The NVA was primarily built up from the alliance-policy objective viewpoint. In this way, its primary mission was to be an instrument of the military policy of the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, one must also assume a domestic function for the NVA as an instrument of securing government power. Compared to the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, that function however never assumed any special significance in the GDR; this is because, on the one hand, the buildup of the government and the conflict with the political opposition groups and forces, that could have endangered the foundations of the system, had been completed by 1956 (specifically, on 17 June 1953); on the other hand, other forces were available for that (People's Police, VP [People's Police] alert units, factory militia units). The change in the domestic mission of the NVA also increasingly emerged by virtue of the fact that it, on the one hand, to a certain extent assumed economic tasks (assignments in mining, in agriculture, and in the construction industry) and, on the other hand, by virtue of its rising significance, within a "military education complex," that is to say, within the context of socialist defense education, it became a part of the general social training and education system. Two prerequisites were necessary for the assumption of this function and they were created partly during the buildup of the armed forces and partly only after their development as a draftee army. The second prerequisite pertained to the development of the NVA as a kind of "political training school" for the GDR which to be sure only covered a certain

segment of the population, that is to say, young males. The first prerequisite concerned the political character of the army, relationships between the army and society, and the question of the relationship between the political and military leadership in the army.

Public life in the GDR on occasion creates the impression that a broad segment of society seems to be dominated by military premises and principles. This appearance often gives rise to the assumption that the military establishment in the GDR is a complex unto itself, that it has a life of its own which fashions the entire political system. If we investigate the relationship between political and military authorities in the GDR, we can see that the party's claim to the leading role in the military sphere was not in danger at any time although a series of conflicts in the NVA again and again necessitated clarifications of the relationship between the party and the army. The entire military establishment, even prior to the founding of the NVA, was clearly subordinated to the party-political institutions. All important military-policy questions, which are within the purview of the SED, were and are resolved by the SED Central Committee Politburo. Within the context of this decision-making process, the Security Commission of the Politburo, the secretary for security questions, and the security department in the SED Central Committee apparatus played or play an important role. The military-policy and security-policy decisions prepared or adopted by those bodies since February 1960 have been implemented by the GDR National Defense Council which was founded at that time as the highest government military-policy body. The chairman of the National Defense Council is the secretary-general of the SED Central Committee; the council itself consists of at least 12 persons. The Defense Ministry which, among other things, contains the Main Staff of the NVA and which is subdivided into several main administrations and administrations, is responsible for transposing these decisions into military practical activities, that is to say, into the sectors of the NVA, the Border Forces, and civil defense¹³. The personnel component likewise clarifies the tie-in with party-policy institutions; the official who is responsible for the buildup of the military establishment--Willi Stoph--was a member of the SED Central Committee Politburo and was directed by the latter to act as minister of interior (1952-1955) or as minister of defense (1956-1960). After the founding of the GDR National Defense Council, Heinz Hoffmann became defense minister; he had a military background but was not equally qualified in political terms; he became a Politburo member only in October 1973. Moreover, there is a series of additional military top-level officials who are members of the SED Central Committee¹⁴.

The institutional component was supplemented by a personnel-policy component in the NVA. During the buildup of the KVP already the SED entrusted a series of its members with military functions. During the original phase of the NVA, party officials were given military training so that they could then be assigned as officers. As part of the recruiting effort, above all for the officer and NCO corps, the SED tried to persuade members of the working class to select those careers in order to firm up its concept of an army organized along class lines. The success of this policy emerged in the increasing number of SED members among the officers and also through the social makeup of that group most of whose members come from the working class. Of course, that share has declined in recent years.

Share of Officers from Working Class

1963	1965	1971	1975
82.7%	82.2%	79.0% (80%)	70.0%

Share of SED Members and Membership Applicants in Officer Corps

1963	1965	1971	1975
96.3%	95.0%	98.0%	99.0%

Source for first table: Blanke, B. M., "Political-Ideological Training and Education in the National People's Army--On the Relationship between the Military, the Party, and Society in the GDR" philosophical dissertation, Bonn, 1975, p 243. The number of 80 percent for 1971 was mentioned by Hager, K., "Die entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft [The Developed Socialist Society], Berlin, GDR, Dietz Publishers, 1976, p 17; 1971, OSTSEEZEITUNG, 28-29 February 1976, supplement; second table: Blanke, p 244; for 1975 VOLKSARMEE, No 4, 1976, p 9.

The SED in the NVA

The work of the SED within the NVA is done by the political organs and the party organizations. That is the most important way for the attainment of the political goals through which the SED tries to implement its leading role in the armed forces

Structure of Party Organs in Military Establishment

Organizational level	Political organ	Party organization
National Defense Ministry	political main administration	party bezirk
Military Districts (armed forces components)	political administration	party kreis
Division	political departments ¹	party kreis
Regiment	political deputy CO (central party directorate of RPO [regimental party organization])	regimental party organization
Battalion	political deputy CO	base organization
Company	political deputy CO	party group

¹--also in the Military Academy and the officer colleges.

On the echelons below regiment, there are no political organs any more. In the battalions and companies, the CO's deputies for political activities are responsible

for guidance in party work and for supervising the execution of party resolutions. The chiefs of the political organs on all echelons at the same time are the first secretaries of the party organizations. The director of the NVA (PHV) [Political Main Administration] accordingly at the same time is the first secretary of the entire NVA party organization; the same applies to the following echelons. The deputies for political work are obligated to report to their party organization and at the same time are directly under the military commander¹⁵.

Political organs and political workers, that is, the chiefs and staff members of the political organs, full-time secretaries of the party and FDJ organization, as well as social-science instructors in military training units and in teaching and research installations, as well as the party organizations, have the task of translating the party's resolutions into practical military activities and guaranteeing their implementation and execution. They handle the political-ideological indoctrination of NVA personnel, they direct competitions, initiatives, and drives on certain occasions, in order to persuade army personnel to achieve special performances and they support the activities of the FDJ organizations in the army.

The political work of the SED in the NVA is exposed to various stresses whose causes are to be found not only in the past of the NVA but also in the present-day political problems, such as, for example, questions of motivation of army personnel, development of political consciousness, relationship between the civilian and military spheres and the social situation of army personnel. Thus the SED, during the first few years of the NVA, faced the problem of implementing the principle of "collective deliberation" by the commanders with the particular party directorates in the major and minor units. For reasons this on occasion also led to a clash between technical military aspects and political demands which was expressed in controversies over the "only military man" and the "only political worker"¹⁶. In 1960, the political leadership developed the view that the new commanders of the NVA were now politically and militarily sufficiently qualified so that the principle of the unity of political and military leadership was implemented. Since then, the commander has been responsible both for military and political work and he is assisted by the political affairs officers as "deputies of the commander for political work." The party moreover tries early to recognize specific interests and expectations in the military sphere in order to be able to determine to what extent they agree with party resolutions, whether new resolutions are required, or whether specifically goal-oriented ideological indoctrination work must be done.

The comprehensive party information system within the armed forces is designed to make sure that the appropriate party agencies at all time have sufficient indicative information and to the situation in the various headquarters, as well as major and minor units. The constantly improving training level of the officers and the attendant increase in political knowledge as well as the fact that the Politburo and the party apparatus have devoted and are devoting special attention to military concerns and needs have so far diminished the conflict potentials¹⁷. Special social-policy measures, such as, for example, housing space allocation, establishment of a special supply system, the MHO (Military Trade Organization), basically better pay and welfare conditions than in comparable positions in the nonmilitary sphere--although under incomparable working conditions--are designed to help improve the living conditions of military personnel and dependents.

Other factors, such as the "prestige" of the individual services and branches, differences in technical standards, but also the differing expectations of draftees and career personnel can certainly lead to unusual interest and conflict situations which must constantly be mastered anew. Especially in this sector--which involves the relationship between the army and society, a relationship which does not boil down only to relations between the Communist Party and the armed forces--the NVA experienced an increase in its missions due to its increasing integration into the GDR training and education system.

Critical Main Points of Military Policy

The SED always fashioned its military policy from two viewpoints. On the one hand, it tried to develop and strengthen the army and the other armed forces and this was closely tied in with the requirements of the Warsaw Pact. It was and is at the same time trying to establish a close link between security policy and social policy. It did this by devoting just as much attention to the political-moral state of the armed forces and the ideal factors of defense preparedness and defense capability of the population as it did to measures which concerned and still concern the material and social foundation of national defense. Both aspects were developed with differing degrees of intensity, whereby the problem of crisis awareness--that is to say, the perception of certain conflict situations, both in the foreign-policy and domestic-policy spheres, played an essential role.

During the years after the founding of the NVA, SED military policy was essentially concentrated on the development of the fighting forces themselves. The political-ideological effect on the population was achieved primarily from the aspect of explaining the necessity for that army and persuading young people to volunteer for service in the army. When, after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the changed role of the fighting forces within the context of the Warsaw Pact, the development of the NVA was speeded up also through the introduction of the draft, the valence of the critical main points pursued so far also changed in the context of military-propaganda and military-education work. The national component, which concerned the relationship between the NVA and national unity, was extensively dropped and instead the national character of the army was stressed by saying that, as an army of the "socialist state of German nationality," it would, in a possible war, not have to fight Germans but the representatives of the imperialist system¹⁸.

This strengthened a line of argument that emerged already during the founding of the NVA. By using the thesis of the class enemy, who had been defeated in the GDR itself--the victory of socialist production conditions was proclaimed in 1961 --but who still was trying from the outside to influence it, the SED legitimized the political function of the armed forces as a guarantor of GDR security. In fostering military traditions, the history and achievements of the NVA are tied in with revolutionary events in German history (the peasant wars during the Middle Ages, the 1813-14 Liberation War, the 1848 March Revolution, the 1918 November Revolution), with special personalities in the German and international labor movement and increasingly also from Prussian history, for example, Clausewitz, Schleswig-Holstein, Gneisenau, and others. In the context of the development of a separate national consciousness in the GDR, this policy leads to a situation where the relationship between the army and society is defined not only as a political one but also as a national one and where the integration of the armed forces into society is promoted in this way. The emphasis on the national element of course

is not supposed to lead to a "nationalistic" attitude which is why the tie-in of "socialist patriotism" and "socialist internationalism" is stressed with a reference to the internationalist character of the NVA as a component of the system designed for the military security of socialism.

One cannot overlook the fact that the SED's military policy was made easier by the fact that the various administrations in the FRG until 1969 more or less officially demanded the reunification and restoration of the German Reich within the 1937 boundaries--something which would involve the dissolution of the GDR and a threat to the territorial status of Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as the Soviet Union. Regardless of the fact as to whether and to what extent such a policy is at all in line with the interests of the majority of the GDR population, it gave the SED an opportunity, in its military policy and military propaganda, to assert an external threat as a fact of life. Here it also acted in agreement with its alliance partners and managed to utilize the existence of the NVA as a factor in the legitimation of its own system.

After the signing of the treaties between the FRG and the Soviet Union as well as Poland in 1970 and the Treaty on the Foundations of Relationships between the Two German States in 1972, the SED found itself persuaded to strengthen political-ideological indoctrination work in the context of its military policy. That was last but not least due to the fact that the anticipation of a military confrontation declines as a result of the development of detente policy, the start of arms limitation talks, and the CSCE. All of this confronted the SED with the problem of continuing to clarify its position in the national and international dispute, whereby it above all made its political-ideological indoctrination effort revolve around the attempts of the FRG to stress the continuing existence of a single German nation and thus to cast doubt upon the policy of the GDR aimed at developing a national identity of its own. The need for retaining and strengthening an army was explained by saying that the so-called "abrupt changes" in Western policy and the contradictions inherent in the imperialist system, but also the worldwide dispute between socialism and imperialism, meant that there was still a danger of a military conflict in Europe. In this way an attempt was also made to counteract the breakdown of the traditional image of the enemy and to strengthen the defense preparedness of the population, primarily the younger generation. Socialist defense education is an instrument in support of that policy.

Socialist Defense Education

Socialist defense education was closely tied in with the development of the armed forces already back in 1957, although under a different name. At that time it was still believed that the party, government, and social propaganda system for the indoctrination of the population in defense preparedness essentially represented an important military-policy factor¹⁹. During the sixties however it was realized that military propaganda alone is not enough and that the intensification of political-ideological indoctrination and the stepped-up involvement of all young people in pre-military training would have to be a component of the uniform training and education system²⁰. This means that both the training and education institutions and the organizations, which primarily recruit young people, that is to say, the FDJ and the GST (Society for Sports and Technology) partly in cooperation with the NVA, stepped up their defense-policy and defense-education efforts.

Social defense education above all is designed to cover all militarily able-bodied members of society but it is especially concentrated on the young people. They are to be educated in defense preparedness and defense capability and they are to be enabled to acquire defense-policy and defense-ethics convictions whose foundation is the identification of the individual with the policy of the SED and the GDR. General measures, above all in the field of education, are being carried out in the general-education and vocational schools as well as in technical schools, colleges, and universities and in the enterprises. These measures cover not only young people in school or in OJT, but also working women and men. Just as the various groups are different, so are the goals of the individual measures also differentiated. On the one hand the important thing is to achieve an understanding for military expenditures and the attendant social and individual consequences, all the way to the intention of persuading individuals to cooperate in certain organizations, for example, the factory militia units, civil defense, or the GST. The GST stages special activities in whose context young people between the ages of 16 and 18 are prepared for military services. The activities for the young people tie in with their specific interests and constitute an attempt to combine those interests with military-policy objectives. The possibilities of being able to drive a car or ride a motorcycle, to operate a radio, to make parachute jumps, to engage in motor or glider sports, to do some sailing or rowing in the GST constitute ever growing incentives for many young people especially where other sports and cultural recreation activities are not as readily available. Military sports activities are aimed at some of the older age groups. Preparations for military service are designed to enhance the training intensity of the NVA and to enable the young people to attain training objectives sooner. After their discharge, the young people are then supposed to cooperate in the GST, in the factory militia units, or in civil defense units as NVA reservists. Facing the realities of military and later on civilian life, facing the problems of living and working conditions and changing personal interests as a rule lead to a situation where the ability to become enthused--if it existed at all--abates quite considerably. The appropriate political authorities try through agitation and mobilization drives to counteract this trend among other things by offering material benefits (expenditure reimbursements) whenever somebody becomes an instructor in the GST in his spare time.

One may well doubt whether this intensive military-education and military-propaganda effort will attain its goal. There are complaints to the effect that the young people lack an understanding of the aggressiveness of imperialism, that they do not develop a clear image of the enemy or that they are not adequately motivated in political terms. The introduction of a teaching subject entitled "Defense Instruction" in 1978 for pupils in the ninth and tenth grades of the general-education polytechnical high school was aimed at persuading the 14-16-year old students to pursue a military career²¹. The fact that there continue to be cases of refusal to carry arms in military service²²—without government or social institutions making propaganda for this possibility—speaks against a total mobilization of young people for the military-policy goals of the SED and for the upgrading of the NVA. Moreover, the conditions of military service and spare time in the NVA are by no means so free of problems that they could not cause changes in the motivation of draftees and career personnel.

If we try to judge the present valence of the NVA in SED policy, then we will not be able to get around singling out the role of the NVA within the framework of the Warsaw Pact forces, on the one hand, and the function in the overall social education process, on the other hand. The role of the NVA in the Warsaw Pact is determined by the fact that it is a part of the alliance fighting forces and is extensively taken out of the national competences of the GDR. To the extent that one can even attempt such a situation estimate, it is a relatively modern and powerful army whose foreign-policy valence resides not only in the improved position of the SED in the military decision-making process of the alliance but also in the possibility of strengthening its activities outside Europe²³. Its domestic valence is determined above all by the fact that it is a significant factor in the overall social education and training process which, in the view of the SED, along with the sphere of social policy, is of no means minor significance to the political and social stability of the GDR social system. The significance of the NVA increases if, due to developments in international politics, the fundamental situation estimate of the SED leadership seems to be confirmed, to the effect that it is the goal of the West, in the current power-policy, economic, and ideological dispute, to weaken the political and social systems of the socialist countries and thus also the GDR and to subjugate them either through domestic unrest or military measures from the outside. The indicators of such a policy--arms race, changes in military balance and economic as well as political boycott--also determine the significance of the NVA and its position in the political and social process. Here is what that means right now for the military personnel of the NVA--the "road is positive."

FOOTNOTES

1. See W. Stoph, "The Army of the Worker and Peasant Government," ND, 19 January 1956.
2. "Against Aggression--for Supporting the Soviet Army," ND, 2 March 1949.
3. In the Law on the Supplementation of the Constitution of the GDR, Article 9 was supplemented on 26 September 1955, as follows: "Service for the protection of the fatherland is an honorable duty," GBL, 7, p 653.
4. "Geschichte der SED," [History of the SED], extract, p 340.
5. ND, 1 July 1956; this does not mean that there was actually a need for a reduction because of the strength of 120,000 personnel had not yet been attained.
6. See St. Tiedtke, "Die Warschauer Vertragsorganisation" [The Warsaw Treaty Organization], Munich, Vienna, 1978, p 25.
7. ND, 12 July 1958; the (still?) valid practice is illustrated by the report entitled "Mixed Commission Meets in Capital," ND, 25 January 1978.
8. ND, 22 April 1965.

9. See also D. R. Herzing, "The Warsaw Pact at 25," in PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, September-October, 1980, pp 1-15. A list of maneuvers can be found in St. Tiedtke, loc. cit., footnote 6, p 69, and in DDR Handbuch (DDR Handbook), second enlarged edition, 1979, p 754; see also J. Gruenert, "The Relationships of a Tank Unit of the NVA with its partner unit of the GSBD, 1970-1976 in Terms of Weapons," MILITAERGESCHICHTE (Military History), No 2, 1980.
10. See R. L. Giles, "The NVA from the Viewpoint of a British Officer," "Die NVA der DDR im Rahmen des Warschauer Pakts" (The NVA of the GDR in the Context of the Warsaw Pact), Munich, 1980, pp 152-160.
11. The Military Balance 1979/1980. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979.
12. On the problem of system and verification, H. Haase, "Growing Financial Burdens on GDR Economy and Their Expression in the Government Budget," DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No 8, 1979, especially p 836 f. Estimates of actual expenditures may have a built-in error of 16 percent. See SIPRI Yearbook 1980, London, 1980, p 15.
13. The Border Forces are not a component of the Armed Forces; the chief of staff of the Border Forces headquarters is at the same time deputy minister of national defense.
14. Among the 145 Central Committee members (in 1980), five were directly concerned with military matters as party or military officials; the membership of the defense minister on the Politburo since 1973 is in keeping with the practice of the other WGO countries.
15. See "Militärlexikon" (Military Dictionary), second edition, Berlin, GDR, 1974, p 297. The chief of staff of the PHV of the NVA is at the same time deputy minister of national defense.
16. See D. R. Herzing, East German Civil-Military Relations, New York, 1973 and B. Blanck, loc. cit., table on p 1304, pp 246-260.
17. The NVA general officer corps so far has not emerged as an interest group on military issues last but not least because Soviet military policy determines the military-policy and armament-policy decisions of the SED.
18. "Defending So ialian Together," ND, 73, 1968.
19. See W. Schiel, "The Brotherly Alliance of the Armies of the Countries of Socialism," Militärsystem (Military Establishment), Supplement 2, No 6, 1957, p 9.
20. See H. Rode Johann-Reckle, "Socialist Defense Education in the GDR," "Studiengruppe Militärpolitik: Die NVA" [Military Policy Study Group: the NVA], Hamburg, 1976, pp 100-133; and D. Schoessler, "Socialist Defense Education in the GDR--System, Function, Arms-Control Policy Aspects," "Die NVA der DDR," loc. cit., pp 161-186.

21. See G. Erbe et al.: "Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in der DDR" (Politics, Economy, and Society in the GDR), second improved and enlarged edition, Opladen, 1980, pp 340-342; and Gisela Heilig, "Nobody Is Born a Hero--On Defense Education in the GDR," DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No 3, 1979, pp 233 ff.
22. See B. Eisenfeld, "Kriegsdienstverweigerung in der DDR--ein Friedensdienst?" (Conscientious Objection in the GDR--A Service for Peace?), Frankfurt/Main, 1978.
23. Reportedly, between 3,500 and 5,500 military advisors from the GDR are supposed to be stationed in African countries. SIPRI Yearbook, 1980, loc. cit., footnote 12, p 7.

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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

GDR CULTURAL POLICIES ABROAD EVALUATED

Review of FRG Scholar's Article

Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV in German Vol 13 No 3, Mar 81 (signed to press 20 Feb 80 pp 264-267

"Ancient History Instead of New Facts--On GDR Cultural Policies Abroad"--Review by Hans Lindenmann, editor, Deutsche Welle, Cologne, of article "A Second German Fare?--On GDR Cultural Policies Abroad" by Dr Kurt-Juergen Maass, jurist, lecturer, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Bonn-Bad Godesberg. Translations of the East Berlin DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK articles cited in footnotes below are published under quoted headings in the following JPRS issues of this series: Footnotes 6 & 10--"Cultural Exchange With West: Obstacles, Imbalances Cited," 74674, 29 Nov /9, No 1742, pp 11-22; and footnote 8--"Western Cultural Policy Been Aimed at Undermining Socialism," 75032, 30 Jan 80 No 1759, pp 33-43

(Text) However welcome it may have been for Dr Kurt-Juergen Maass to examine a topic not often dealt with, that is GDR cultural policies abroad (DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV 12/1980, pp 1281 ff), the end results of his labors are rather unsatisfactory.

Maass' study exhaustively describes the establishment of the GDR Martin Luther Committee in preparation of the reformer's 500th anniversary. However, he has nothing whatever to say about the meaning of this committee for GDR cultural policies abroad, although the GDR is zealously advertising in noncommunist countries that tourists should visit the "land of the Reformation" in 1983. Let me cite just three examples:

In April and May 1980 a delegation of the GDR Lutheran Church paid a first official visit to the United States (incidentally, the delegation was received by Walter F. Mondale, at the time American Vice President, an honor unprecedented for visitors from the GDR). Among the items discussed were the preparations for the Luther anniversary. The topic was obviously of great interest, and several American theologians are already contemplating being present at the Luther celebrations in the GDR.¹ As happened quite frequently in the past, the GDR Foreign Ministry was perfectly happy to allow precedence to the clerics in order to have them help prepare the ground for East Berlin diplomats.

In September 1980 an international conference on German philology was held in Finland.² When the congress was dealing with Luther's influence on linguistic development, the GDR Cultural Center in Helsinki adroitly used the occasion to draw the attention of the conferees to the establishment of the Luther Committee in the GDR.

Finally Gerald Goetting, deputy president of the People's Chamber and chairman of the GDR CDU, was at pains in November 1980, in the course of his visit to Indonesia, to inform the Protestant Church of that country about the 1983 Luther celebrations in the GDR.³

The purpose is therefore perfectly obvious even now: In 1983 the GDR hopes to receive everybody who is anybody among Protestant theologians, from Japan and Indonesia to North America, and from Tanzania to Scandinavia. Contacts with clerics in the noncommunist world are of considerable importance for GDR foreign cultural policies. That is certainly one of the main reasons why CDU chairman Goetting replaced a communist as president of the League for Friendship among the Peoples as early as 1976.

Maass' study repeatedly refers to sections of the book "Auswaertige Kulturpolitik der DDR" (GDR Cultural Policies Abroad), written by Kurt Mueller and the author of this review in 1974. These references are particularly numerous when Maass talks of the 1970 Beethoven Bicentennial and the 1971 Duerer Year. At the end of 1980 he would have done better to more closely examine the period 1975-1980 in order to fill the gap, instead of serving up a rehash of stale information. The Institute for Classic German Literature in Weimar, for example, was established in the fall of 1978, not in 1979 as Maass states. Again Maass is wrong in claiming that this institute is designed only "to coordinate and plan literary research for the period 1750-1830--evidently with a view to the Schiller and Goethe years in 1980, 1982 and 1984." Much more important is the remark by Prof Hans Dietrich Dahneke, director of the institute, that the work of this research agency will "offensively intervene in the dispute about 'German national culture' between the GDR and the FRG" (October 1978 interview by the Erfurt newspaper DAS VOLK--organ of the SED Erfurt Bezirk management). Maass does not even mention the "GDR National Council for the Cultivation and Diffusion of the German Cultural Heritage," established in 1980 and of far greater importance. According to GDR Minister for Culture Hans-Joachim Hoffmann,⁴ the exercise of influence on "the diffusion of the results of the cultivation and acquisition of the national cultural heritage abroad" is one of that bodies duties.

Subsequently Maass cites three random examples from the GDR's cultural efforts abroad without pronouncing any comments whatever. He mentions, for instance, "a gift of 1,000 science books from the GDR" to Afghanistan, as if there were no more important items to be reported about the GDR's cultural relations with that country. Maass is evidently unaware that Anahita Ratebzad, an intimate associate of Babrak Karim and minister for education, visited Berlin in the first half of 1980 and, in her discussions with Public Education Minister Margot Honecker, certainly did not talk only about a gift of books. In fact the conversations between the two ministers dealt with the issue how the GDR (which used to have almost no impact culturally on Afghanistan) could help the country in the matter of educational policy.

Maass' second example, the establishment in April 1980 of a Japan-GDR cultural society in Japan, makes little sense unless one knows that Japan is currently one of those noncommunist industrial nations enjoying priority attention in the GDR's cultural policies abroad. The reason? As far back as February 1979 the Japanese news agency KYODO reported that GDR Ambassador Horst Brie had submitted to the Japanese Foreign Ministry a request by GDR Council of State Chairman Honecker "in

the near future" to travel to Japan. Then Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda reacted by saying that Tokyo would welcome Honecker's visit. In the meantime KYODO reported on 26 December 1980 that Honecker was likely to visit Japan next May. As in the case of Austria, therefore, the GDR was particularly active in Japan from the cultural aspect.

Maass offers no background information when noting that the GDR and France concluded a cultural agreement in June 1980. At that time full accord was achieved about the reciprocal establishment of cultural centers in Paris and East Berlin. Consulting GDR sources only and not taking into account the views on cultural policies in the respective partner country, it is either impossible to arrive at any conclusion or all too easy to arrive at the wrong ones. In France's long tradition of exercising a "civilizing mission," cultural relations have always tended to be considered integral elements of foreign policy. As France already has institutes of culture in Budapest and Warsaw, it wished to be represented in East Berlin also. However, talks between the GDR and French foreign ministries were stalemated for years because East Berlin was determined to conclude at least a consular agreement with Paris before negotiating a cultural agreement. At the Quai d'Orsay the priorities were exactly reversed. The GDR eventually obtained its consular agreement only when it was prepared to accept a French cultural institute in East Berlin, although the actual establishment of the center still has a long way to go. Actually the GDR is interested in this institute for a single reason: It urgently needs teachers of French because in the Soviet Zone/GDR schools badly neglected the teaching of that language from 1947 on. This neglect is having highly adverse effects now that East Berlin is making strenuous efforts to expand relations with the French speaking countries of Africa. French interest in the expansion of cultural relations is demonstrated by the fact that Xavier du Causse de Naselle, deputy head of the French ministerial department for culture, science and technology, has just been appointed Ambassador to the GDR.

Maass is wrong to claim that "the significance accorded by the Honecker regime to the GDR's 'cultural relations' with the West has shown an extraordinary upswing." State Minister Dr Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher told the Bundestag as long ago as 9 November 1978 that the GDR's cultural efforts worldwide had not noticeably increased but that a shift had occurred, toward the Western countries at the expense of operations in Third World countries. In fact, 33 of the total of 83 musical and theatrical groups the GDR dispatched abroad in 1978 went to Western countries, compared with only 22 in 1972.⁶ At the same time the GDR is currently also compelled to concentrate on priority undertakings. A prospectus of GDR cultural endeavors abroad in 1980, for example, mentioned that only "about 60 GDR groups will give guest performances in other countries, primarily of course in friendly socialist countries" (information provided by the general director of the GDR's artists agency).⁷ This means that in 1980 fewer GDR troupes went to the noncommunist world than in 1978.

Furthermore Maass is asserting incorrectly that, upon the establishment of the GDR cultural institute in Paris, East Berlin would have 11 such centers worldwide. In fact this would make only 8 (Helsinki, Stockholm, Paris, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia and Damascus), because Jakarta and Bogota, also listed by Maass, have only unofficial cultural centers rather like the Thomas Mann Center in Rome. Bratislava has merely a branch of the Prague Information and Cultural Center of the GDR, just as in Poland the Warsaw institute maintains a branch in Krakow.

Maass writes: "In the GDR also it is held that the study of a language provides important ideological and political input, in fact the image of that country. At the same time it is possible to achieve long-range contacts with the students and enjoy opportunities for influencing them" (p 1285). That, however is not Maass' own interpretation, it is that of Prof Dr Erhard Heselachneider, formerly director of the Leipzig University Institute for International Studies and, since July 1980, director of the Leipzig Herder Institute. In his article entitled "New Elements in the Cultural-Propagandist Foreign Policy of the Main Imperialist Countries Toward Real Socialism" Heselachneider summarized the "new elements in the cultural foreign policy of imperialist countries" under 10 headings. Under heading No 8, a full year before Maass, he wrote (and I quote verbatim): "Efforts to encourage the learning of languages are made (in Western countries--author's interpolation)...because the study of a language provides important ideological and political input, in fact the image of that country. At the same time it is possible to achieve long-range contacts with the students and enjoy opportunities for influencing them."

Maass also errs in claiming that "more than 15,000 students from 118 countries" have been educated at the Leipzig Herder Institute. By the end of 1980 "some 14,000 students from more than 120 countries"⁹ had studied there. From the book "Auswaertige Kulturpolitik der DDR" /GDR Cultural Policies Abroad/ Maass cites the statement that the FRG is not even mentioned in the book "Deutsch--Ein Lehrbuch fuer Auslaender" /German--A Textbook for Foreigners/, published in Leipzig. He neglects to inform his readers that the textbook was published in 1968, and that by now there have been several new editions which may well contain revisions.

Incomplete and obsolete is Maass' assertion that the Herder Institute looks after teachers of German in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and the CSSR. GDR lecturers now also work in Romania, Finland, Sweden, France, Britain and Portugal.¹⁰ Maass is therefore mistaken in reasserting in 1980 the 1974 finding that "the GDR has not yet succeeded to achieve any real influence on the organization of the teaching of German at schools and universities" in Romania. After all, since late 1979 the FRG has maintained a cultural institute in Bucharest. Its good work has much to do with the fact that the GDR now sends first rather than second rate German lecturers to Romania, and that the supply of books from the GDR to be used in Romanian schools or universities has become far more extensive and sophisticated than was the case in the years prior to 1974.

Maass thinks that it is impossible to gauge how far the GDR has succeeded "by its cultural policies abroad to define another German image abroad." Bonn has far fewer doubts on this issue. Anita M. Mallinckrodt's comprehensive study "Die Selbstdarstellung der Beiden Deutschen Staaten im Ausland--'Image-Bildung' als Instrument der Aussenpolitik" /The Self-Portrayal of the Two German States Abroad--'Image Shaping' as a Tool of Foreign Policy/ provides a mass of interesting facts on this topic, especially regarding the relations between the GDR and the United States. Asked upon his return from that country "what do people in the United States know about the GDR?", a GDR theologian replied: "Generally not much." Unprompted Americans always had trouble in locating the GDR on the world map.¹¹ Visitors returning to the GDR from far distant countries have often given similar answers.

FOOTNOTES

1. See STANDPUNKT, East Berlin No 12/1980.
2. See STANDPUNKT, No 11/1980.
3. See HORIZONT, East Berlin No 52/1980.
4. BONNTAG, East Berlin No 4/1980.
5. See AP, 9 January 1978.
6. See DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, East Berlin No 10/1979, p 100.
7. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19/20 January 1980.
8. DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, No 12/1979, pp 77/78.
9. NEUE ZEIT, East Berlin, 24 December 1980.
10. See DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, No 10/1979, p 103.
11. STANDPUNKT, No 12/1980

Dr Maass Article

Cologne DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV in German Vol 12 No 12, Dec 80 (signed to press 21 Nov 80)
pp 1282-1287

[Analyses and Reports' feature article by Dr Kurt-Juergen Maass, jurist, lecturer, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Bonn-Bad Godesberg; author of "Die Bildungspolitik der europaeischen Gemeinschaft" (The Cultural Policies of the European Community), Bonn 1978, and numerous articles on European cooperation in cultural affairs: "A Second German Face? On GDR Cultural Policies Abroad"]

[Text] German culture abroad--that is more than musicians from Berlin and Hamburg, poets from Cologne and Munich, works of art from Essen and Freiburg, scientists from Kiel and Erlangen. The foreigner meets German art also by way of the Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra, works of art from the Dresden state art collections, scientists from Rostock's Wilhelm Pieck University, teachers of German from the Herder Institute at the Leipzig Karl Marx University. Another German face? An annoying competition?

The Bonn Government is apparently unconcerned. Commenting on the Bundestag inquiry on "Cultural Policies Abroad," it stated in September 1977: "Despite the political division of the Germans the Federal Republic's cultural policies abroad are based on our common German culture. We maintain that common history, culture and language have always been the crucial props of our people's unity and will continue so to be. We will therefore uphold our common cultural bases not only in inner-German but also in international relations, and we will encourage all valuable expressions of German

culture." As a result of this tenet Federal German cultural policies abroad recognise no obstacle to the distribution of modern GDR literature abroad, for example books by Anna Seghers, Johannes Bobrowski, Christa Wolf, Stefan Heym, Hermann Kant or Peter Huchel.

GDR cultural politicians have an entirely different viewpoint. They no longer acknowledge a united German cultural nation. Instead they see two basically disparate cultures, "imperialist barbarism" in the FRG and "socialist German national culture" in the GDR. Article 18 of the 1968 GDR Constitution, for example, says: "The socialist society encourages the cultural life of the working people, nurtures all humanist values of the national cultural heritage and of world culture, and develops socialist national culture as the concern of the entire people."

Critical Appropriation

Whenever, therefore, the GDR carries on cultural policies abroad using the names of Schiller, Goethe, Duerer or Beethoven, it does not consider them personages of German intellectual or musical history but rather exponents of the GDR's cultural antecedents. The GDR has 'critically appropriated them' by dealing with the cultural achievements of past centuries within the social context and within the framework of a social process.

On 13 June 1980, for example, Council of State Chairman Erich Honecker said in East Berlin: "Among the progressive traditions we cultivate and pursue are the work and the legacy of all those who have contributed to progress, to the development of world civilization, regardless of their social and class ties... The socialist German Democratic Republic...is the rightful heir of the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the other democratic forces against capitalism and war, of the revolutionary actions of farmers, artisans, clerics, intellectuals and artists, the members of the bourgeoisie, in short all those who have advanced social development."

Martin Luther is the latest example of this "critical appropriation." Quite recently still GDR historians described Luther as a "lackey of the princes." The curriculum still valid for the sixth grade calls upon teachers to deal with Luther's betrayal of the revolutionary farmers and explain to the class the connection between the defeat of the German farmers and the development of Luther's Reformation into the "Reformation of the princes."

November 1983 will be the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth. In preparation of the celebrations a Martin Luther Committee of the GDR was set up, headed by Erich Honecker. Luther's works and the comments about him by prominent contemporaries have now been diligently searched to see whether he could not, after all, be included in the GDR's pantheon. The result: Honecker celebrated Luther as one of the greatest sons of the German people: "He was one of the most outstanding humanists whose efforts were directed to a juster world...one of the pacemakers of those radical changes by which the German states and Europe entered the era of the decay of feudalism and the bourgeois revolution." This change of heart is supported by quotations from Herder, Schiller, Heine, Marx and Engels. Heinrich Heine, so said Erich Honecker in his speech, saw in Luther the indomitable man and, despite all the tragic contradictions within himself, the great forerunner of progressive and rational thought, who--by the sheer power of his language--gave the Germans not only a new

faith but also an effective instrument of the popular movement. Marx and Engels, for their part, he said, have on many occasions honored the progressive historical achievement of Luther and the Reformation. Friedrich Engels, for example, interpreted Luther's work as part of the bourgeois "revolution No 1" and explained it as the result of the inevitable developmental processes in the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

Beethoven's Cherished Music

There have been several precedents for such a "critical appropriation." Prof Walter Siegmund-Schultz, German philologist and art historian at Halle University as well as vice president of the GDR Federation of Composers and Musicologists, said in 1970, the Beethoven Bicentennial year, "Beethoven's music is so cherished, so indispensable, so exemplary--and therefore has its legitimate home in the socialist society. Beethoven's music can be sung, played and listened to in good conscience only...where the ideal of the final abolition of man's exploitation by man--an ideal passionately championed by Beethoven in his works--has been achieved."

In the Duerer Year (1971) Prime Minister Willi Stoph said in Dresden that "Duerer occupies an important place in the evolution of a socialist national culture" in which humanist traditions also are rooted: "(However those) who, like the ruling circles in the FRG, pursue reactionary and revanchist politics, have no claim on a heritage which, in its ideals and great artistic images, expressed the progressive concepts at the dawn of the modern age. Our homage to Duerer clearly demonstrates the profound and unbridgeable contrast between imperialist cultural decadence which falsifies and distorts the memory of Duerer and the vital effective survival of his art, and the realism of the renaissance art properly judged one of the great traditions by our socialist national culture."

Increasingly--and the Martin Luther Committee is only the latest example--the GDR is making every effort actively to revitalize the cultural heritage. In 1979, for instance, the Institute for Classic German Literature was established in Weimar, designed in particular to coordinate and plan research on literature in the period 1750-1830--obviously with an eye to the Schiller and Goethe years of 1980, 1982 and 1984. Prof Hans-Dietrich Dahnke, director of the new institute, had an article in the first issue of PRISMA, a new cultural GDR quarterly, published in German and English and distributed free of charge in the FRG. He wrote: "We note that the younger and young people who have grown up in our socialist society, have an entirely different attitude to history and, therefore, the literary heritage than those who once helped build this socialist society. In general we no longer see any large-scale identification with the presocialist humanist heritage; instead the attitude to all this has become more sophisticated and multifaceted--and not only historico-critically in a productive meaning but including indifference and rejection."

Practical Examples

How do the GDR's cultural policies abroad actually operate? Three recent examples will serve to elucidate this point:

1. In March 1980 the GDR Ambassador to Afghanistan handed Kabul University a gift of 1,000 volumes of scientific texts from the GDR.

2. In April 1980 a Japan-GDR Cultural Society was established in Tokyo. The initiators were well-known personages from the Japanese economy, science and culture, who--on the occasion of the GDR's 30th anniversary--had set up a preparatory committee in 1979. Yoshiaki Irobe, president of the Kyowa Bank, accepted the chairmanship of the new society. According to its charter the society intends to promote friendly relations between the two countries and contribute to increased cooperation in the field of arts, science and sports.
3. In June 1980 French Ambassador Bayle and GDR Foreign Minister Fischer signed a cultural agreement in East Berlin, which--among others--provides for the exchange of teachers and professors, the exchange of publications and reciprocal visits by groups of children. In addition it specifies the basic conditions for the construction of a French cultural center in East Berlin.

These examples illustrate a long-standing and increasingly noticeable trend in the GDR's foreign policy toward the "capitalist industrial countries" of the West: Risen to an exceptional extent has the value placed by the Honecker regime to the GDR's cultural relations abroad as they touch upon the West. The means used by this cultural policy are largely identical with those practiced by the FRG: Concerts, exhibitions, grants, gifts of books, language instruction, readings by poets. The GDR endeavors to define itself against the FRG and provide its own image in other countries.

The GDR Image Abroad

The GDR's "cultural foreign relations" have undergone certain developments in the course of the years, just as happened in the case of the FRG's cultural policies abroad. Until the early 1970's the emphasis was on the GDR's efforts to gain recognition; subsequently the aim was to culturally define the country. At the present time the trend also includes the wish to improve the GDR's image abroad, because that image has been increasingly embarrassing to the GDR leadership. In a newspaper interview in 1979, shortly before the opening of the exhibition "The Splendor of Dresden--5 Centuries of Art Collections" in the United States, Hans Joachim Hoffmann, member of the SED Central Committee and GDR minister for culture, said: "It must be assumed that this GDR exhibition in the United States will have very many visitors. We also know that much is being done in the United States to let the public know about the exhibition, for example reproductions of the works to be shown are already on sale. All this will surely help by means of art to convey a true image of the GDR and its nurture of the cultural heritage of mankind, thereby reducing prejudice or refuting anticomunist stereotypes regarding our country and its culture."

For this exhibition in the United States the GDR sent 700 works of art from the Dresden museums across the Atlantic. It turned out to be a triumphal progress. More than 1.5 million Americans viewed it in Washington, New York and San Francisco. Book fairs or film festivals, educational grants or the exchange of scientists also serve--as is admitted quite frankly--to promote a "correct and most comprehensive image of the GDR," to strengthen the "prestige of the GDR" and spread the "truth about real socialism in the GDR." The more than 60 bilateral friendship societies of the GDR worldwide have now been assigned this objective as a primary duty.

Stockholm East and Stockholm West

In addition to the friendship societies GDR cultural institutes are the main instrument of GDR cultural policies abroad. In its June 1980 cultural agreement with the French Government the East Berlin Government also obtained approval for opening a cultural institute in Paris. With Stockholm and Helsinki it will make three such institutes in Western Europe and eleven worldwide (the others are in Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, Bratislava, Sofia, Jakarta, Damascus and Bogota). The example of Stockholm where the FRG is represented by a Goethe Institute, demonstrates the competition between East and West.

Guenther Coenen, now head of the foreign department at Goethe Institute headquarters in Munich, directed the Stockholm Goethe Institute from 1972-1976. According to him the vicinity of a GDR cultural center represented a gain, not because there was any cooperation but because "two separately operating institutions pursued the same objective--the spread of German culture." At the same time each country had its own way of referring back to its own or the common past, simply with reversed signs. According to Coenen the Swedes did not accept this artificial division of Germany's past and considered the two cultural institutes interesting versions of the same thing. The cultural programs of the two institutes were scrutinized with the same critical objectivity. Coenen says: "The German departments of universities, especially, were interested in maintaining the best possible contacts with both parties and quite ready, on occasion to play both sides against one another to derive some benefits."

Coenen is unwilling to venture an opinion as to who did better in this competition. In his view the Swedes were ultimately convinced by total honesty: "They judged both parties from one aspect: Are they self-critical and frank, do they try at least to be open or do they attempt to convey an image that we ourselves are unable to verify by our informational potential, in other words by television or the press or even our own visits?"

Political Task of Linguistics

Competition and demarcation do not stop at the German language either. The language is better suited than any other medium for the spread of information and opinions about the GDR and the FRG. In the GDR also it is held that the study of a language provides important ideological and political input, in fact the image of that country. At the same time it is possible to achieve long-range contacts with the students and enjoy opportunities for influencing them. The GDR therefore endeavors just as much as the FRG to provide instruction in the German language, not only abroad but also at home. For example all foreigners wishing to be educated at a GDR university, advanced or technical school are first made to study for 1 year at the Leipzig Herder Institute. There they are taught the necessary basics of German, among others. Since the institute was founded in 1956, more than 15,000 students from 118 countries have been taught there. The Herder Institute uses the much praised 2-volume manual "Deutsch--Ein Lehrbuch fuer Auslaender" [German--A Textbook for Foreigners] which, incidentally, does not include a single mention of the FRG. Only the city of Goettingen is referred to once, because Robert Koch took his state examination in that town.

However, the Herder Institute--and the Goethe Institute also--had to take cognizance of the fact that abroad, especially in developing countries, German textbooks are acceptable only if prepared in cooperation with the respective countries agencies, and if their texts are relevant to the national situation and culture. As a result--and that is one of the few such instances--there has been German-German cooperation in some cases when the section concerned with the German speaking region was co-authored by a team of writers from the GDR, the FRG, Switzerland and Austria.

Of course the GDR collaborates most intimately with German linguists in the socialist fraternal countries of Eastern Europe. Almost two thirds of the places in academic summer courses on German philology organized at the universities of Leipzig, Halle, Jena, Erfurt and Rostock are reserved by way of "cultural operation plans" for scholars from East European socialist countries. Lecturers from the Herder Institute look after more than 6,000 teachers of German in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and the CSSR, supply them with material and facilitate attendance at refresher courses. Only in Romania has the GDR failed to achieve any real input regarding the organization of German instruction at schools and universities.

The Important Follow-up

Nobody who ever studied in the GDR on a scholarship is subsequently forgotten. Upon his return home, his name is forwarded to the respective GDR legation, and every effort is made to keep in touch ever after. In some countries there are even associations of former scholarship students. In September 1979, for example, GDR newspapers reported that the approximately 300 Indians who have had to date received technical training in the GDR, had established so-called GDR Returnees Clubs in six major Indian cities. The club in New Delhi was presented with a library for members, including technical literature from the GDR. Other former scholars become members of the respective national "friendship society," of which there are by now 60 altogether. These friendship societies also serve the realization of GDR cultural policies abroad. With their help visits are organized, friendship weeks arranged, national opinionmakers approached, propaganda materials distributed and, in some countries, GDR cultural centers operated. All threads from the friendship societies end in the League for Friendship among the Peoples; its current president is Gerald Goetting, chairman of the GDR CDU. Such friendship societies also exist in Western countries. In France, for example, the friendship society boasts 16,000 members.

Scholarships for Target Groups

The award of GDR scholarships differs substantially from those of the FRG. The GDR first of all asks who is to get a scholarship, taking into account--among other considerations--key positions and target conceptions. Only then does it offer specific scholarships. One of the most important considerations is the fashioning of contacts with the opinionmakers of the country, who may--beyond the actual cultural sector--influence view about the GDR in the respective country and are able to contribute to the realization of the GDR's political and economic goals. At the "School of Solidarity" (part of the International Institute for Journalism) in East Berlin, for example, further education courses are organized for newspapermen from developing countries, dealing with the theory and practice of newspaper work. Many graduates are now exercising management functions in the mass media, political organizations and, not least, government agencies of their countries.

Another example worth mentioning is the Advanced School for Economics in East Berlin. Its 13-year old Institute for the Economics of the Developing Countries has by now trained more than 300 undergraduate and graduate students from 30 countries.

It is not yet possible to say how far the GDR has succeeded by its cultural policies abroad to define another German face abroad. No data are available. At the time of the Dresden exhibit in the United States, for example, many Americans approached then FRC Ambassador Berndt von Staden to offer praise and congratulations. As far as they were concerned Dresden was located in "Germany." And that does not apply to Americans only. Everything originating in the GDR or the FRG tends initially to be considered German. That holds true even more the further we move from the purely politico-ideological sector. From that aspect there are many German faces in the world, in some cases the features may be more Western, in others more Eastern.

Not important for Bonn?

The FRG registers GDR cultural activities abroad attentively but complacently. In May 1979, speaking on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Sonnenburg International Study Group, Hildegard Hamm-Bruecher, state minister at the Bonn Ministry for Foreign Affairs, said "our cultural offer abroad is more open, broader, relevant and sophisticated than the GDR's ideologically stilted cultural endeavors. The interest in our offer is therefore usually greater even in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Unfortunately, other than persistently championing our principles, we can usually not do much more than rely on the internal cohesion of a culturally indivisible Germany such as is demonstrated just now in the conflict between well known GDR writers and their regime. At the same time we must certain avoid exploiting this for political reasons alone. We are confident that the maintenance of the unity of German culture escapes the political and ideological manipulation of either side."

Observers noted that the GDR's cultural policies were not even mentioned at the symposium on international cultural relations--bridge across the borders, held in Bonn in May 1980. Asked about this omission Mrs Hamm-Bruecher stated that, by virtue of the FRG's self-definition, the cultural relations between the FRG and the GDR as well as the discussion of the latter's cultural policies abroad could not be a topic of the FRG's cultural policies abroad. After all, the GDR was not a foreign country. It seems to me that the Federal Government is thereby taking the easy way out. The GDR's efforts at demarcation in the cultural sector have very definite effects on Bonn's cultural policies abroad. East Berlin activities therefore deserve greater attention.

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POZSGAY INTERVIEWED ON CULTURAL POLICY

Budapest NEPMUVELES in Hungarian No 1, 1981 pp 3-6

(Imre Pozsgay minister of culture at the regional congress of the Association of Hungarian Public Educators)

[Text] Imre Pozsgai replied to questions posed after his lecture at the regional congress of the Association of Hungarian Public Educators.

[Question] Comrade Minister, from the vantage point of one's identification with our socialist nation, what major organizing principles and ideological goals do you judge to be significant in the upcoming period? How do you see the incorporation of these principles and goals into socialist public opinion? As is well known, in this connection one can sense a noted bewilderment in our society, and within that also among our intelligentsia, which is expressed in sterile debates in our periodicals, in aborted initiatives, etc.

[Answer] It would be easy for me to reply, if we were only concerned with basic principles. The principles which are appropriate to and known to be characteristic of socialism, and which are also components of our people's world view, are immutable. There can be no misunderstanding of this. I am referring to the majority of our people even when speaking of ideology, because we regard our society's role within the confines of socialist national unity to be unambiguous. This means that we are a socialist society, and that this is good for us. Our nation found the social system that is most suitable to its needs. It also created appropriate political institutions, which are functioning smoothly, especially with respect to the leadership position of the party. This leadership position is being accepted by our society as a whole, irrespective of ideological considerations. These are the most important signs of our identification. Along with this identification with socialism, our people have also identified themselves with their national history, and have accepted that in the foreseeable future they will be building socialism within a national framework and amidst certain national peculiarities. There is no debate on this question, and this holds true both on the highest political level, as well as on the most elementary forums. Nor is it difficult to pursue a cultural-educational policy in this respect. Difficulties arise beyond this level. As an example: Is Marxist social science really ready to put together a more current, more realistic, and more sophisticated portrait of our society than the one we have been used to? A program in this connection was in fact prepared at the party's highest forum. This is contained in the party platform of the Eleventh Congress. But there are still some questions. Will such programs influence adequately our everyday lives? Do they relate to our people's

immediate world of experience? And will they be accepted by our people as their own? Moreover, does our society function effectively, and can it increase its performance potential? The Twelfth Congress has demonstrated that the answer to these questions is in fact a "yes." Yet, we still must improve the conditions under which our society functions.

Contradictions, tensions and interest-relationships must be analyzed, so that the country's leadership will continue to be effective and that society will be able to identify itself with this leadership. In light of my own experiences -- which has also been demonstrated by the social science debate of 1973 -- our young people's interest in the significant, all-encompassing ideological questions and political strategies has increased. To make these all-encompassing goals acceptable to the youth constitutes a unique cultural and educational program. This has to be done not in the form of the customary political agitation, but on the basis of ideological convictions.

One might question as to whether the journal debates concerning these and other related questions are really meaningful? From a political point of view, debates are meaningful even if they bring forth views that do not rhyme with, or perhaps even contradict our own view of things. Debates are valuable because they demonstrate both the openness of society, as well as the desirable direction this openness ought to take. They also indicate that a society is free of taboo and that basically every significant question can be openly discussed. Of course, the level of the debators' sense of responsibility is another matter. And this is also true concerning the question as to whether they express their views within the limits of this responsibility, or perhaps with the intention to weaken politically the cohesion of society.

While tabus do not exist, there are still some limits regarding publicizing some views. Nor is it a taboo to acknowledge this fact. As an example, views and programs that question the foundations of our social system cannot be propagated in Hungary. It is best to acknowledge this openly, than to claim that everything is permissible here, and at the same time contradict this claim with our deeds and attitudes.

In other words, I am convinced that the ideological foundations for one's identification with society are in fact present in our system. Simultaneously, however, there is a need for directives and instruments of orientation that reflect today's realities. But changing this situation is not the responsibility of educators, but primarily of politics and of the social sciences. In addition to their innate value, a sizeable portion of the debates in periodicals has also produced a corpus of information that is not specifically related to the debated topics. I regard this to be useful. Of course, these debates reflect varying degrees of social commitments and social responsibilities. Even so, it would be a mistake to refuse to debate. A paternalistic attitude that rejects everything would be neither useful, nor successful. It would likewise be wrong for every initiative, every reasonable idea to originate from a single source. This would make all things emanating from that source subject to suspicion. It is only through such means that one can hope to fight against the cultural-educational bureaucracy, which we well know exists.

[Question] Many socialist and western nations have a rather faulty and at times, distorted and untrue view of the achievements of today's Hungarian society and culture. What measures does the Ministry contemplate to improve knowledge about our country and about our culture abroad?

[Answer] Undoubtedly, the ministry also has obligations in this area. At the same time, however, one must realize that a nation's culture can only become really known to the world if the world realizes that it has a need for that culture. Without such a realization, it is almost impossible to make the Hungarian culture known abroad. Of course, success in this area also depends on propaganda and information. And here we have much to do. The Ministry is certainly aware of the magnitude of its obligations. The general picture, however, is not so dark as presumed by our interviewer based on his own experiences. We have no reason to complain about book publishing, music, the arts, and the status of Hungarian science and scholarship in the socialist countries. These have much prestige there, and their achievements are known far more widely than ever before. In the western world, however, this recognition is stifled by a unique condition, namely by the fact that in the capitalist countries cultural achievements reach the public through business channels. Thus, if the propagation of Hungarian culture brings no profit, then it is simply not propagated. Of course, the western business interests do not necessarily acknowledge this fact so openly. Historical considerations also make it difficult to penetrate the developed capitalist countries. This is also true because of a number of contemporary phenomena, such as certain trends and intellectual-spiritual waves, which do not always favor Hungarian culture. As an example, the institutional system of the mass media and the large entertainment enterprises in the largest capitalist countries is in the process of Americanization. This American "cultural imperialism," however, is beginning to be resented by these countries. Not long ago I visited France, along with Kalman Gyarmati, your association's president, where we heard many complaints about this American influence. It hurts their national pride. They seem eager to turn to their own culture, as well as to the culture of other nations, so as to counteract this influence. It is perhaps this psychological state of mind, combined with our own effective work and a number of other factors that made it possible for us to register some noteworthy gains during our recent discussions. Let me just cite one example of the many questions on the agenda discussed. We agreed that the year 1981 be regarded by the French musical world as the "Bartok Year," and that with the help of the relevant institutions they will perform all of Bartok's compositions.

The culture of the world is multicolored and inexhaustible. We should not be deceived by the fact that it is virtually impossible for us to encounter signs of Hungarian culture in these countries. That would be a phenomenon comparable to encountering Tokay wines and textiles from Györ while walking down the Champs Elysees. We simply cannot find Hungarian culture abroad in this manner. True, we are already there in spirit, in influence, and in historical presence in a number of western countries. But it is also true that only an immeasurably lesser quantity of our culture reaches those countries than rightfully deserves.

While we are on the topic of international cultural relations, let me add something else. Before going off to negotiations, we are often urged -- even by Hungarian public opinion -- to try to initiate our discussions on the basis of complete reciprocity. In other words, that we should build our relationships on the basis of give and take. But this is a bad advice. After all, we do not publish French

books and musical scores, and or show French films to simply fulfill our international agreements, but because our people need these cultural values. Thus, we cannot approach this question from the vantage point that we will publish French books only if they publish Hungarian books in return. By the way, I dwelled on Ruth on France simply because my recent experience is still fresh in my memory.

(Question) With the exception of health pedagogy, the new Ministry is in charge of all college and university-level education. Thus, it is in a position to influence college and university students to participate more intensively in the dissemination of public culture. What is the Ministry of Culture doing in this regard?

(Answer) Let me first of all correct a misconception. The Ministry is not in charge of all institutions of higher learning. Other ministries also control some higher educational institutions. The already cited resolution by the Council of Ministers has instructed the new Ministry to examine the question of supervision in cooperation with the other ministries. At this point I cannot tell yet what the results will be. We do not look upon this as something specifically within our sphere of competence. As to who should exercise control over these institutions is a question that should really be decided after careful study. In one specific instance, however, there is agreement among the interested ministries: namely that our Ministry wishes to exercise its concrete authority over all institutions of higher learning only after the legal re-examination of the relevant regulations. It is in this manner that we will have an input as to how the institutions of higher learning prepare our youth for their role in public culture.

As a matter of information it should be mentioned here that we are in the midst of working out a reform for higher education. This is a long-range program of at least fifteen years, wherein the popularization of the spirit of public culture will occupy a significant role. The compartmentalized system of higher education simply has to be transformed into an avenue to prepare intellectuals who will also excel as specialists after graduation.

(Question) Forty per cent of the educators in our cultural centers have professional education, but sixty percent do not. We in Bacs County offer college preparatory courses every year for those who wish to continue their education. But the quota is so small that only a few of them can be admitted. Will this quota be raised? It would certainly improve the situation if the teachers' training colleges would establish counselling centers.

(Answer) Why the admission quotas are what they are have their own reasons. I would especially like to call your attention to one thing. The ministerial decrees concerning public educators have all emphasized that we should regard as educators not only those who have degrees in the field. In other words, we have expanded our pool of cadres, as well as the possibilities of our cadre politics. We are indeed in need of very well-trained persons. Thus, by issuing such decrees, our intention was not to make concessions in the area of quality, but simply to expand our pool of potential cadres.

The interviewer's question still leaves untouched an important problem of which he must be just as much aware as the rest of us. This has to do with the fact that the number of well-prepared specialists in the field of public culture is not simply a question of training. Equally important is the presence of mutual respect, as well as a many other factors. The Ministry will certainly have to devote much more attention to this question. I am well aware that we still have debts to pay in the area education, and that the reform in higher education will have to take this into consideration. We also have debts concerning the position of cultural workers, notwithstanding the slight improvement in their social standing in the course of the past few years. In order for well-trained persons to join the ranks of professional educators -- irrespective of the field of their studies -- we will have to make some changes also in areas outside the field of education itself.

(Question) I am still concerned about public education. The level of instruction is so low that the newly appointed minister will simply have to concentrate his prestige and resources to this area, and thereby perhaps contribute to leaving behind the decline of culture to that of development.

(Answer) I am most grateful that you are already attributing some prestige to us. This is primarily based on the prestige of the Hungarian Government. But I am hopeful that the ministry too will soon earn its own prestige through its own achievements. My co-workers at the present often express the view that there ought to be harmony and cooperation among the departments of the ministry. This is a "command" that we must heed. But we do not desire unity at a low level, with reduced requirements. Cooperation is a good thing, but normal cooperation also involves the resolution of conflicts.

Of the schools today the primary school is in the most distressing situation. In order for us to prevent the further growth of double-shifts in primary schools during the upcoming years, and in order to fulfill the laws for mandatory educational requirements, we would have to build twelve-thousand classrooms within 5 years. This is a huge number, and we would be happy if we could achieve half of this goal. Besides all this, during the Sixth Five-Year Plan, we wish to carry out the theater and opera house renovations at a cost of several billion forints, and we want to improve our library network. Cultural centers are also essential, but not as much as primary schools. Expanding the potential of the radio and the TV networks is also cultural development, and thus cannot be deprived of their means during the next Five-Year Plan. Notwithstanding these many serious obligations, the guidance of arts and public education cannot take a backseat among the ministry's activities. We are striving to lessen the problem in both of these areas.

(Question) When will the legal regulations concerning the comprehensive institutions in small settlements be published?

(Answer) Within a half of year. We are also being urged to do this by the statements made at the fall session of the Parliament. Moreover, the government has charged the Ministry of Culture, as well as the financial and other ministries, to reach concensus among themselves on this matter within the earliest possible time. We have to elaborate the regulations for the comprehensive functioning of both the existing and the newly constructed institutions.

[Question] Following the appearance of the Central Committee's resolution concerning public culture, the relationship between the cultural centers and the places of employment became much stronger. We are more willing to support education at the workplace. At the same time, however, the new regulations have nothing to say about the tasks related to this. What are your views on this matter?

[Answer] My answer is that not all types of activities need to be legally regulated. At this point I cannot say what else should have been included in these regulations. But simply I would like to caution everyone not to regard socialism as if everything therein is legally regulated. If the cultural centers can establish contacts with the places of employment, and if they regard these contacts as important, then let them do so. And, if they can get financial and other forms of help from the workplace, all the better. If legal regulations concerning this matter are needed to aid this relationship, then we will have to formulate some.

[Question] Will there be a national regulation that will require the enterprises to transmit the appropriate portion of the cultural fund to the communities where their commuting employees live and spend a significant portion of their leisure time?

[Answer] This is an old and a painful problem that is very difficult to solve. From the vantage point of legal regulations it is virtually impossible to satisfy this need. But we also have to add another point; namely that the fulfillment of the financial needs of the individual communities does not depend entirely on their own income. Our economy functions on the basis of the so-called redistributional or reappportionment system. I am not an expert on financial and budget matters, but I believe that a socialist public management cannot do anything else for a long time except to adopt a redistribution system. This involves the distribution of incomes and obligations on the basis of specific budget goals, programs for the development of settlements, as well as other considerations. In this way one can prevent a further imbalance in the settlement equilibrium. Many communities would actually cease to exist, if they were compelled to support themselves on the basis of their own incomes. Our sense of justice would tell us for example, that in the case of the commuting worker, who lives in Szalkaszentmarton already receives more from the national budget, through the county, than would be its due on the basis of its own income potential? Given these circumstances, how can we deprive the company of these funds? It would be most beneficial if the leaders of the individual companies would recognize that they also have certain obligations toward their workers even in their places of residence, and that this includes also the field of culture. The existing labor shortage has already initiated in these types of activities. But once this shortage disappears, the factories and shops will be even more reluctant to offer such financial sacrifices.

[Question] Can the Ministry do anything to have the country's economic and social leaders understand and accept the above-discussed interconnections between economics and culture?

[Answer] Yes. There are many possibilities, from the Central Committee, through the government and its committees, to the individual companies. Our own potentials are, of course, limited. But we can still do something, and I believe that the general appreciation of this problem has increased. The interconnection and mutual dependence between economics and culture is demonstrated by the resolution on public

education, by the relevant laws, as well as by the existence and achievements of the National Council on Public Culture (OKT). During the past 5 to 6 years, however, the situation has hardly changed. What is the reason for this? I am forced to disagree with the interviewer, who undoubtedly had some unfavorable experiences. I regard it an important factor that since the party resolution concerning public education, and later the passage of the education act, we have witnessed a significant change in the views of government administrative and economic leaders.

In my view, one of the results of this change is the fact that we are investing almost three times as much into culture as was appropriated in the Fifth Five-Year Plan. And we could not have achieved this if the plan had been simply fulfilled without affecting changes therein. This is three times more than the planned sum! The county councils, the councils general, and the economic organs all had a major role in this. Even if our possibilities for moving ahead are limited in the next cycle, the Sixth Five-Year Plan will still allocate at least as much. I believe that we can rightfully expect this, even though I cannot possibly anticipate the government's and the parliament's decisions.

The other good omen is that we have also witnessed certain gains in the area of having made public education into a mass phenomenon. And we could hardly have achieved anything here without the cooperation of the economic organs and the companies. It is something else -- although we also have to mention this -- that we also pressed for things which have only increased the doubts of industrial leaders concerning the significance of culture. As an example, let me just cite our ever-recurring problem, the education of the socialist brigades. We are trying to achieve quick results by means of forced and unsuitable methods. But this only undercuts the cause of public education.

When I lectured to factory managers, someone related the following incident to me: He visited one of the workshops, where he saw a young engineer pushing a wheelbarrow filled with books toward the work benches. He asked the engineer what he was doing. "Well," says he, "I am fulfilling my public educational obligations: I am selling books to the workers." This incident points to an unusual degree of confusion. I am not an economist, but I regard it the primary cultural goal of an economic unit that it should fulfill its economic tasks. At the same time, it should try to support those aspirations of the workers that they are hoping to achieve during their leisure time. The most important ethical and educational goal of any shop should be to make sure that it functions well as a shop. I am not trying to eliminate culture from the shops. I am simply trying to put it into its proper perspective. The above-mentioned incident and the attitude that it reflects simply helps to increase the suspicion concerning public education. In Budapest, as well as in the country as a whole, there is a great demand for culture. Yet, at the same time it is possible to foretell that at theaters where it is impossible to buy tickets at the ticket window there is going to be a half-house on a certain day. This happens when the organizers have sold the tickets to a single shop or company, or when they have distributed them free of charge. I am against such shame and vanities. Let us not call these the promotion of public culture. Regarding thriftiness? Mercantilistic economists have discovered long ago that one can economize only on the basis of something. And this holds true even today. One can economize only on the basis of something, and not against something. Of course, the correct attitude to take is that where a 100 watt lightbulb suffices, one shouldn't use a 200 watt bulb, and when there is a dripping faucet, one should

either turn it off or fix it. But these are only elementary economizations. True frugality has to have a goal: One has to save for something. This is precisely what we would like to achieve, in conjunction with the government financial leaders, also in the cultural field, including the field of education.

[Question] What actions have been taken to suppress the business activities of certain artists, and generally toward making cultural entertainments financially attainable?

(Answer) Undoubtedly, there are artists whose attitudes are less than commendable, and we are willing to censure them for their demeanor even at this time. But this is not really our primary concern. Rather, it is the fact that under the paternalistic care of the state we have produced a degree of contraselection in all branches of art. With the exception of a few truly great artists, who enjoy exceptional prestige, the state has assumed the obligation to take care of all artists, and thereby it drew a kind of equality sign among all of them. The "fundamental principle" behind this patronage of the arts was the goal that no artist should ever have to suffer privation, for that would weigh heavily on our conscience. Let me cite one example. We have established the Arts Foundation which purchases works of art to the tune of millions. It used to limit its purchases of such artifacts to the value of one million forints. Today this one million has risen to three million. Moreover, they seem to be buying everything. The Arts Foundation has in effect become an instrument of social welfare. As a result, when these purchased items are placed on exhibit, we are forced to hide for weeks, hoping that we will somehow survive the storm of criticism. In other words, our original goal has been turned against us. And I could cite such examples from a number of other fields as well. I am well aware that the extortionism used by some of the artists in the cultural centers is unbearable, from which we can draw a number of conclusions. First: Success can always be achieved by using stars who are known throughout the country from their films and TV shows. They require no special organization. Nor is this a problem. The cultural centers, however, can hardly make any demands for their services. Thus, I am offering a more difficult solution. Let the centers organize meaningful and amusing programs by using other performers. Second: No one should draw the conclusion that we are surrounded by overpaid, wealthy artists who are living off the people. Nothing could be further from the truth. The income of these artists in terms of dollars is very modest indeed. This fact must also be taken into consideration, for we simply have to manage our resources within the given possibilities and within certain limits.

I find the explanation for the above contraselection in the fact that we do guarantee a secure existence to every artist on a relatively decent and modest level. In the area of entertainment we can perhaps also tolerate certain business considerations. I do not intend to downgrade the field of entertainment with this remark. I am simply emphasizing that entertainment is a basic need that has to be satisfied. But it is not a primary need that should be offered to society as a gift, gratis. There are many other things that would also be nice to offer free, but we cannot afford to do so. There are the textbooks, for example. I wouldn't even reject the intrusion of private enterprise into this sphere. I am stressing this because one has often heard -- in the creative arts, for example -- that state support should be replaced by private galleries or other display forms; or perhaps even by private studios for business purposes. In this connection we already have a decree by the Minister of Culture, form March 1955, which makes the above solution possible and which is legally still in force today.

[Question] In the search for realism during the most recent period we have witnessed a number of conflicts between literature and sociography (sic) and our cultural training policy. How should these conflicts be assessed? Do we have taboo topics?

[Answer] There were such conflicts in the past, and there will also be in the future. At times and under certain conditions politics has an obligation to judge even artistic, literary creations and sociography. This type of criticism is acceptable only if it rests on solid ideological foundations. First, politics has to be clear as to its purpose when calling someone to account. The cultural directives of 1958, which I have cited a number of times already, emphasize clearly the freedom of creativity. They also assert that it is not the party's task to intervene into questions of artistic style. Second, politics usually chooses the works of art it wishes to support, but it relates to them strategically. In other words, politics does not expect art to support its twists and turns on a daily basis.

There is a difference in their respective approach to things, therefore. Politics is an exposé of reality, for it is a form of consciousness, and not simply a form of action. By the same token, art also reflects social reality. But they work with different means and with different methods. For this reason it is only natural that their respective portrayals of reality are at times different. In the interest of society, politics can also control publicity. This is that particular taboo area that I cited earlier. Socialism relates differently to art than does the citizen state where, social mobility is determined by the iron laws of economics and by the conditions of the labor force market.

The primacy of politics in a socialist system is derived from the fact that socialist ownership has no definable and identifiable subject comparable to that of the capitalist system. This function will be exercised by politics -- or rather by one of its organizations, the party -- for a long time to come, even if this entails responsibilities and obligations. Neither a politician, nor a public educator should ignore this responsibility but consider it a fact.

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INTERPRESS OFFICIAL: MODERATES MAY GET REFORMS

Stockholm NY DAG in Swedish 3-7 Apr 81 p 9

[Interview with Ryszard Kaczmarek date and place not given]

[Text] The Polish people have one more time shown their sense of responsibility and their patriotic involvement. It may very well be that what we have witnessed will turn out to be a historic event. The agreement reached between the Polish government and the trade union movement Solidarity shows that it is entirely possible to reform a socialist society in Eastern Europe in a peaceful manner.

This is written by Ryszard Kaczmarek, a commentator of the Polish news agency Interpress. He has written this comment on the request of NY DAG.

But there certainly is still reason for concern, according to Kaczmarek, who points to the extremist wings that exist both within the party and within Solidarity.

The agreement between the trade union movement Solidarity and the Polish government was reached exactly 3 minutes before the most natural deadline that can be imagined. For the last 24 years the most important news broadcastings of the Polish television have been sent at exactly 7:30 p.m. Every delay has caused excitement and confusion. A delay at this point when the tension that had ruled in Poland for the last 48 hours had reached a climax could very well have provoked mass hysteria. The Polish would simply not have been able to stand it any longer.

A Sense of Responsibility

The main problem does, however, stand out very clearly; a national catastrophe with extensive international effects has been avoided. The Polish have again showed their maturity, their patriotic involvement and their sense of responsibility. On Monday even professional optimists were close to desperation.

The agreement was possible to accomplish only because both parties were willing to make concessions and to accept compromises. Lech Walesa said late on Monday night that he regarded the agreement as "a 70 - 80 percent success, the rest we had to give up." Government sources say unofficially that they are "fairly satisfied with the contents of the agreement."

It may very well be so that a quite new model for social negotiations has now been created in Poland. It is a model with no total winners and no pitiable losers.

It is a model for co-habitation in a country that has never had much experience with democracy. Historically this may turn out to be a real turning point.

Solidarity has been able to pass its most important requirements regarding the events in Bydgoszcz. The government has in exchange received a assurance that the public authorities are not going to be illegally detained nor taken in. Solidarity has been able to pass the requested public condemnation of individuals charged with the abuse of trade union activists. The government's request that all future actions by Solidarity be carried out in agreement with existing laws was granted.

Extreme Forces

It is, however, not true that it is a matter of only two competing forces in Poland. It is actually a matter of four directions or tendencies.

There are two moderate main trends both within the party (the United States Polish Labor Party) and within Solidarity. Besides, there are, to everyone's regret, two parallel extremist movements on both sides. The Solidarity extremists are, however, far more numerous and certainly also much louder. This circumstance involves explosive dangers. There is reason to believe that these two extremes will try to affect the national reconciliation during the next few days.

Possible Reforms

The exemplary solution that was reached on Monday night in Poland is enormously important not only with regard to international politics, but also in an ideological sense. This shows that it is entirely possible to reform the socialist system of Eastern Europe, that it can be modified and adjusted in accordance with a changing reality. It also shows that the dominating interests of the working class are more important than suddenly-appearing conflicts of opinion or a general suspicion between the majority of the population and the government.

When seen in a longer historic perspective the Polish example can very well come to be evaluated by future historians as one of the most important events of this century. Provided, of course, that the foundation of the agreement proves to be lasting.

9662

CSO: 3109/151

'CRISIS' OF RELIGION IN MODERN WORLD DISCUSSED

Bucharest CONTEMPORANUL in Romanian 17 Apr 81 p 5

[Article by Marius Nicoleanu]

[Text] For several years in the past, the terms secular and secularization in western literature devoted to the religious phenomenon have gained more and more obsessive usage, with their being handled almost equally both in non-Marxist sociological literature as well as actual theological literature. Etymologically, secular should mean that which is of "the age," which belongs to the specific spiritual nature of a given cultural era. Secularization, the correlated term, tries to grasp the complex and often contradictory process of the migration of the "sacred" into the area of the "Profane." There still are a number of discussions about the context and significance of the utilization of the term resecularization, for example, if it should be linked with the secularization of church goods or the broader philosophical problem of the divorce between "sacred" and "profane," stressed at the same time as the development of the modern and hurried thinking of French enlightenment. But this is not the basic fact in this discussion; in the vast literature accumulated on this subject, the historical problems themselves occupy a secondary place.

One of the most authorized representatives of secularization is the neo-Protestant theologian H. Cox from Harvard University, Massachusetts, United States, while his work entitled "The Secular City, Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective" (New York, MacMillan Co., revised edition, 1966; references in the text will be made to this edition) has been noted in specialty literature as a special writing. "Secularization," the author states in this book, represents man's liberation from under religious and metaphysical tutelage and the return of his attention from other worlds to his world." In the same meaning, in another essay he drew attention to the act that secularization "means that the world of human history is that which insures the horizon through which man understands his own life." These concise conclusions are supplied by the fact that in our age "the secular city" with its range of social and cultural levers has produced an enormous impact on the method of establishing the "sacred" in everyday life. Analyzing a number of social aspects, broadly commented on by modern American sociology, such as social mobility, professional and geographic mobility, "anonymity," the rapidity of changes at all levels of life in the big metropolises, the "lifestyle" of the American whose matrix is a pragmatic spirit, the conclusion of the American theologian is always the same: at the present time "sacred" is going through a powerful crisis." The "technopolitan," the resident of the big cities," no longer is concerned with "mysteries," with the life beyond, but he is concerned with more "prosaic" problems, those of his day-to-day life. For him everything must be filtered through the pragmatic maxim of "such and such a thing will succeed."

In the same perspective, the theoretical and practical problems resulting from religious doctrines become collateral if not totally indifferent for the modern believer. In order to solve his problems of life, the American theologian clearly notes, the technopolitan no longer appeals to the priest but rather "consults with his colleagues at work." In this situation, another representative of the radical theological movement, J.A.T. Robinson, an Anglican priest, adds, religion for many believers becomes a kind of "candy," of if you want some crutches upon which, in order to become mature, the believer must cast away as fast as possible. The uselessness of religion, at least in its "unsecularized" form, is suggested to the Anglican priest by the most banal and common events in life. For example, when one flies, it is normal for the individual no longer to pray to God to protect him from a catastrophe ; simply, he "entrusts" himself to the ability and experience of the pilot to land the plane safely. The conclusion he offers us with a fine sense of humor is very suggestive. "Man discovers that he no longer needs God and religion. He realizes that he can fly with his own wings without constantly referring to a heavenly father above him or to cling to his mother's skirts" (see "La Nouvelle Réforme," Yvonchâtel, Delachaux & Niestlé, 1966).

However, it should be stated that by its essence, as we shall see, secularization, filtered through a theological perspective, does not seek the abolition of religion and faith in God but, at most, adaptation of it to the spirit and modern language of "secular" man. As such, he militates surely for a "modernization" of the main subjects and central figures of the Christian religion. The purpose? The preservation of religion under these new formulas in the mentality of the modern believer. The first thing which must be secularized is the very traditional image of God, a distant divinity, cold, impassive to pain and man's tragedies. This priest states, "The God who is the cause and who permits suffering even of a child is morally insupportable." (*Ibidem*.) At this moment of truth, the moment of confrontation with oneself, the priest issues conclusions and even more harsh reflections: "Religion is disgusting. God does not resolve the problems of suffering; he merely amplifies them." Later this picture of a divinity who leads the destinies of the universe from the heavenly heights is totally overcome by the achievements of modern cosmological sciences, just as faith in a God who "produces cancer or send streptococcus" is just as puerile. What sensible man or woman, the Anglican priest questions, would continue believing that disease is a divine punishment or that death is due to "spells?" These naivetes, in the case where they still exist, belong to the time when people still believed that the earth was flat (*ibidem*).

H. Cox also militates for eliminating this deteriorated picture of the divinity, even if for the reason that man can completely disperse it. The God of Christian tradition, he points out, resembles the hero of S. Beckett's well-known play "Waiting for Godot" like two drops of water: "Just like Godot, He (God) has the habit of appearing at the time and in the place where people are not seeking Him" ("The Secular City") Whereas earlier, for primitive man, the divinity could still be invoked, with results or without, for increasing the harvest and collecting rain, at the present time this God has become completely opaque, distant, foreign to the interests of modern man. As J. A. T. Robinson determined together with other radical American theologians, he drove himself away from the life and concerns of the people and "no attempt of religious manipulation can reintroduce him any longer with force" ("La Nouvelle Réforme"). In a maximum effort at a critical understanding of the situation, the Anglican priest compares his God with a great tyrant, with a "bloodsucker" which has dried up human liberty (*ibidem*). The conclusion? This God no longer is effective for the mentality of the secular believer and he must die. Also from here we have the name which this doctrine has received or taken, that of the "theology of the death of God." Whatever the solution, what kind of God, however, would still be

represented to modern man? First, a divinity which would be "fully" geared to the social-political events of the modern era, modernized, according to the feature and similarity of today's believer. The maximum hypostasis of this metamorphosis is also met in H. Cox, also called the theologian of "secularization," which no more and no less makes the Christian God a modern "revolutionary" who inspires and heads the social-revolutionary movements in our era. This novel picture of the Christian divinity comes from the falsification of certain texts in Marx' work, also an awkward labor.

The Virgin Mary, the second member of the "holy" family, however, has been an even more original fate in the secularized view of faith. As we know, the figure of the Madonna for centuries has played an important role in Christian theology. At the present time, at least in American society, the trend is to replace her with another modern deity, "Eros," having two "missionaries": "Miss America" and "Playboy." Miss America is the omnipresent icon for the consumer society, regardless of whether it is a question of a banal consumption of beer or the acquisition of the most insignificant object on the market of secular civilization. He creates a certain "structure of values" behind all the commercials, a "personal identity for the initiates." There are certain similarities between the Virgin Mary and Miss America. Whereas the former has symbolized many of the ideals of Christianity, Miss America embodies the values of the consumer society. Whereas in the Middle Ages many believers were swimming in heavy gold in order to insure the Madonna's good will, today, still expensive but in dollars, Miss America is selling her sexy smile to the new followers. Although Miss America does not have her own temple, without her the entire building of mass persuasion, through Eros would fall in ruins ("The Secular City"). Yet the two female characters are in a clear antithesis. Whereas the Madonna symbolized suffering and sacrifice, Miss America on the other hand extols wealth, luxury, Eros, and she cultivates easy passions based on the psychology of the excitement of a momentary pleasure. The new values the cultivating of which are hinted at by the recent idol are false, deceiving. They cannot save the technopolitan from the need for self-confrontation. In the end, this is because they are not definitive for secular man with his complex personality. Miss America is felt by H. Cox to be at most a siren from the pages of "Elle," who entices more and more followers with a distinct cruelty. The incense on her altar is consumed in a much more illusory way and in a way bearing death than in the case of the Madonna. The conclusion? Radical theology is facing the desirable of rousing and reconditioning the all too-well-known face of the Madonna in order to cope successfully with the "idolatrous" invasion of the new deities brought by the consumer society.

Finally, the legendary figures of Jesus Christ from the Gospels also is subject to deterioration under the impact of the secular life in the big American cities. Here radical theology utilizes more subtle weapons and maneuvers, more credible concepts. It proposes a humanized Christ who would be fully adaptable to the humanist seekings of the modern era. First, the legendary hero from the Gospels is a nonconformist, a protestor, even if it is a matter of his oppositions to the religious taboos of the society in which he lived. Equally, the social "vocation" is emphasized, elimination of the existing barriers in the society of time, from the point at which he was against artificial walls between "nationals," "Greeks," "Jews," "publicans" or "the wealthy." His very way of life—these "modernizations" of the abovementioned theologies insinuate—was one of a "free" man, the way in which he was formed in his pilgrimages among the degenerate elements, the marginal elements of society, being a kind of "outsider" of those times. Later during his time, Christ combatted precisely what are the "vices" of modern consumer society: man being swallowed up by "things," by the interests and riches of this world.

but a secularized church is appropriate for a secularized theology, also. So everything that at the present time represents the Christian church is a kind of "eccentric club," a building which cost "this many dollars," a simple address where, for centuries, Christians gathered to listen to "an old, very old tale." So, another representative of radical theology asks, what would be left of the Christian services officiated in today's churches, no matter what denomination they are, without "the touching tale of Mary and the gardener" from the so-called resurrection of Jesus? What would become of Christmas without "the naivete of the tales of Matthew and Luke?" Thus, first, a change in the subjects of the cult acts is needed. W. Hamilton, another exponent of radical theology, straightforwardly supports removing prayer from the list of cult acts, from the moment that the believers are addressing a "dead" God. At most a new liturgy could be inaugurated, one dedicated to "the death of God." H. Cox is the most original person in his modernist reformulations of cult acts, requesting that prayer eventually be practiced as a dance, a game, a joke. Prayer should not be associated with seriousness and sobriety: "The believer's ability to laugh while he is praying is a great gift," he asserts in another of his works, particularly if the prayer is being "sung" or "danced."

However, we repeat, it should be stated that the criticisms made by radical theologians do not follow the line of abolishing either religion or the church. I have dwelled at other times on the significance of "the death of God." What is interesting is that the radical American theologians openly recognized that they are not militating for the disappearance of God from Christianity but, at most, for modernization of the traditional picture of it, in this way attempting to still keep it in the soul and mentality of the modern believer. Stressing this dilemma and hesitation of the particular theologians faced with atheist conclusions which could result from their concepts, J. A. T. Robinson tries to show the motivation for keeping faith even if its secularized form: "The hounds of heaven still hound us." Overall, the theological interpretation of secularization, despite clear-sighted connotation and observations regarding the conclusions of sociological investigation, continues to remain under the fold of fideism, from the point at which modern social history is placed under the same statute of "listening" to a "revolutionary" God and is conceived as a "history of saving" man from sin. Another aspect also is significant. The abovementioned theologians are rather calm and impassive when it is a question of secularization as such. When the discussion goes further and arrives at what they call secularism (a concept which involves the denial of divinity), they become at once not only cautious but also opponents. As a whole, here is where the gaps in the pantheologism of secularization lie.

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AMENDED LAW ON AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT BODIES PUBLISHED

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 25, 11 Apr 81 pp 1-4

Law No 31/1977 on the Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management and the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management

[Text] Law No 31/1977

on the Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management and the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management*

The Program of the Romanian Communist Party for Forging the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society and Advancing Romania Toward Communism establishes measures for improving, in all fields of economic and social life, the organisational framework that is to provide for the active participation of the masses of working people in devising and carrying out the party's policy of constant and balanced development of the economy and rational distribution of the production forces over the country's territory.

In order to provide for the fulfillment of the tasks and objectives established for agriculture by means of the program of the party and the decisions of the 11th party congress, it is necessary to create representative bodies of the working people in agriculture, which are to discuss and to help to substantiate and finalize the draft annual and long-term plans for economic and social development and the programs for implementing them.

For carrying out the party's policy in the field of agriculture, in order to achieve modern, high-yield agriculture, and for implementing the decisions adopted at the Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management, the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania adopts the present law.

* Republished on the basis of Article II of Law No 1 of 26 March 1981, published in BULETINUL OFICIAL AL REPUBLICII SOCIALISTE ROMANIA, Part I, No 21, 30 March 1981.

Law No 31/1977 was published in BULETINUL OFICIAL, No 112, 28 October 1977.

Article 1. There is instituted the Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management, the highest forum of agriculture, the food industry, silviculture and water management, by means of which there is provided the direct and effective participation of the working people in these fields of activity in the preparation and adoption of the decisions regarding the continual development and modernization of agriculture, the food industry, silviculture and water management, the growth of agricultural, food and silvicultural production and the growth of the contribution of these sectors to the development of the national economy and to the general raising of the well-being of the peasantry and all those who work.

The Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management discusses the basic problems of the agrarian policy of the party and state, the ways and means of fulfilling the tasks contained in the party's program and in the sole national plan for economic and social development, of the improvement of worker self-management and economic and financial self-administration, and of the continual development of collective labor and leadership.

Article 2. Representatives of the management councils of agricultural production cooperatives, the council of working people in state agricultural enterprises, in agricultural mechanization stations, in food-industry enterprises and in silvicultural and water-management units, delegates of the county and communal commissions of agricultural producers in localities without cooperatives, the members of the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management, party activists, scientists and teaching personnel in agricultural, food-industry and silvicultural education, and representatives of ministries and other state and public bodies participate in the proceedings of the Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management.

The Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management meets once per 5 years and is convened by the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management.

The standards for representation at the congress are established by the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management.

Article 3. The Congress of the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives, the conferences of the councils of working people in state agricultural enterprises, in agricultural mechanization stations and in food-industry enterprises, and the conference of agricultural producers in localities without cooperatives perform their proceedings during the Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management.

Article 4. The Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management adopts decisions binding on all collective leadership bodies of state and cooperative units and other public organizations in the field of

agriculture, the food industry, silviculture and water management and on all agricultural producers.

Article 5. The Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management has, as a body of wide representation with permanent activity, the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management.

The National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management provides for the coordination and accomplishment, in a unitary conception, of the actions and measures necessary for fulfilling the provisions of the sole national plan for economic and social development in the field of agriculture, the food industry, silviculture and water management, the application of the principles of worker self-management and economic and financial self-administration in the whole activity, and the implementation of the decisions of the Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management.

The national council pursues, in its whole activity, the attainment of the objectives of the new agrarian revolution with regard to the growth of agricultural production and of labor productivity in agriculture, the raising of the technical level and the growth of the economic efficiency of this branch, the complete and efficient use of the land, the main means of production in agriculture, the raising of the production potential of the soil, the implementation of the land-improvement program, the sensible use of the technical-material base, the work force and the specialists, the introduction and generalization of technical progress, the raising of the contribution of the activity of scientific research to the progress of agriculture, and the providing of a high level to the entire general social activity in villages and communes.

In the field of the food industry, the national council takes steps to provide for the raising of the degree of high utilization of agricultural raw materials, to expand and diversify the assortment of processed products, to raise the quality of foodstuffs, to increase the percentage of protein derivatives of vegetable origin in the people's diet, and to meet the requirements for a rational, scientifically substantiated diet for all categories of consumers.

In addition, the national council adopts measures for increasing the production potential of the forests, for protecting, conserving and developing the forest resources, for sensibly managing the resources of timber and combating the wasting of it, for regenerating the forests and improving the poorly productive ones, for reforesting, for preserving in the silvicultural holdings the valuable species of trees acclimated to the country, for improving the protective functions of the forests, and for developing the harvesting and high utilization of forest fruit and other natural resources and accessory products of the forests.

In the field of water management, the national council pursues, within the framework of the Program for Organizing the Hydrographic Basins of the Country, the organization, in a unitary conception, of the whole hydrographic network, to ensure the meeting of all needs for water for drinking, industry, irrigation, energy production and other things and to protect the localities, industrial platforms and

agricultural areas from floods, the economization and recycling of water, the reduction of consumption and losses, and the maintenance of water purity and quality.

Article 6. The National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management has the following main duties:

- a) It organizes the application and supervises the implementation of the party decisions and the country's laws regarding agriculture, the food industry, silviculture and water management and the decisions of the Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management;
- b) It analyzes the annual and long-term plans and the programs for developing the branches and subbranches in agriculture and the food industry, in silviculture and in the field of water management.
- c) It establishes measures for the application, in the entire activity of the units in agriculture, the food industry, silviculture and water management, of the principles of worker self-management and economic and financial self-administration and for the fulfillment in the best way, by these units, of the tasks that devolve upon them from the sole national plan for economic and social development;
- d) It establishes measures for the sensible and complete use of land resources, the utilization of high-yield seed varieties, the expansion of high-yield animal breeds, the application and improvement of the production technologies in crop and animal husbandry, the food industry, silviculture and water management, and the scientific organization of production and labor;
- e) It establishes measures for completely using the production capacities and the work force, fulfilling the targets for delivery of products to the state supply, making investments, increasing the economic efficiency of the agricultural, food-industry, silvicultural and water-management units, and raising the contribution of agriculture and the other sectors to meeting the consumption needs of the population and the whole national economy;
- f) It analyzes the stage of fulfillment of the production, economic and financial plans for the whole of agriculture, the food industry, silviculture and water management and according to their branches and adopts the measures necessary for continually improving the production and economic activity in all units and for fulfilling and overfulfilling the plan provisions;
- g) It discusses and gives its opinion on the draft regulatory acts referring to the organization and operation of agricultural, food-industry, silvicultural and water-management units and to the activity of their collective leadership bodies and on other drafts that concern the improvement of the work in its fields of activity;
- h) It provides for the unitary orientation and management of the management bodies of socialist units in agriculture, the food industry, silviculture and water management, for continually applying the principle of collective labor and leadership, improving the work style and methods, promoting criticism and self-criticism, and increasing the responsibility of all members of these bodies in fulfilling the tasks that devolve upon them.

Article 7. The National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management is responsible, for the activity performed, to the Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management.

Article 8. The National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management is composed of:

- a) The Council of the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives;
- b) The management councils of:

The Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry;

The Department of the Food Industry;

The Department of State Agriculture;

The General Economic Directorate for Horticulture;

The General Economic Directorate for Agricultural Mechanization, Irrigation, Transportation, and Production of Equipment for Agriculture and the Food Industry;

The General Economic Directorate for Land Improvement and Construction in Agriculture;

The National Water Council;

The Department of Silviculture;

- c) The Presidium of the Academy of Agricultural and Silvicultural Sciences;

- d) The working people's councils of:

The Central for Utilization of Cereals and Technical Plants;

The Trust of Enterprises for Production of Mixed Feed;

The Flax, Hemp and Cotton Trust;

The "Piafar" Trust;

- e) The board of directors of the Bank for Agriculture and the Food Industry;

- f) The Central Commission of Agricultural Producers in Localities Without Cooperatives;

- g) Representatives of:

The Central Committee of the Union of Communist Youth;

The National Council of Women;

The unions of trade unions in agriculture, the food industry, silviculture and water;

The institutions of agricultural, food-industry and silvicultural higher education;

h) Working people who work directly in agricultural production in agricultural production cooperatives, state agricultural enterprises, agricultural mechanisation stations and food-industry, silvicultural and water-management units who do not belong to the management bodies of these units and agricultural producers in localities without cooperatives, in accordance with the standards established by the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management. The number of them will represent at least 30 percent of the number of members of the national council.

The members of the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management mentioned in Letter g are appointed by the collective leaderships of the respective organizations for a period of 5 years.

The members of the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management can be recalled by the bodies that appointed them.

Article 9. The National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management has a chairman, a first vice chairman and six vice chairmen, chosen by the national council.

The chairman of the national council is an activist in the party and state leadership.

Article 10. The National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management meets once per year and whenever necessary. The council performs its activity in the presence of at least two-thirds of the number of its members.

The National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management performs its activity in a plenum and in commissions.

The number and the composition of the commissions are established by the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management.

During the proceedings in a plenum, the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management can also perform its activity in sections.

Article 11. The National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management has an executive bureau composed of 57 persons:

The first vice chairman of the national council;

The vice chairmen of the national council;

2 secretaries;

40 members.

The composition of the executive bureau is established by the national council.

The post of chairman of the executive bureau is held by the first vice chairman of the national council. In the absence of the chairman of the executive bureau, his duties are performed by one of the vice chairmen, whom he appoints for this purpose.

Article 12. The executive bureau conducts the activity in the period between the sessions of the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management and provides for the implementation of its decisions.

The executive bureau meets once per quarter and whenever necessary and works in the presence of at least two-thirds of the number of its members.

The chairman of the national council participates in the sessions of the executive bureau.

Article 13. The National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management and the executive bureau adopt decisions by means of an open ballot, with a majority of their members.

Article 14. In order to create the organisational framework for the direct participation of agricultural producers in localities without cooperatives in establishing and implementing the measures for growth in agricultural production, there are formed, within the communal people's councils, commissions of agricultural producers.

The communal commission of agricultural producers is composed of 9-15 members chosen for 2 and $\frac{1}{2}$ years by the assembly of agricultural producers in localities without cooperatives.

For conducting the activity between sessions, the communal commission chooses an executive bureau formed of three-five members. The chairman of the communal commission is the vice chairman of the executive bureau of the communal people's council.

The communal commission meets quarterly and whenever necessary. The commission is convened by its executive bureau.

Article 15. In counties where many communal commissions of agricultural producers operate, there are formed, within the county unions of agricultural production cooperatives, county commissions of agricultural producers in localities without cooperatives.

The county commission of agricultural producers is composed of 11-31 members named, for a period of 5 years, by the executive bureau of the county people's council.

For conducting the activity between sessions, the county commission chooses an executive bureau formed of five-nine members.

The chairman of the county commission is one of the directors of the general directorate for agriculture and the food industry.

The county commission meets semiannually and whenever necessary. The commission is convened by its executive bureau.

Article 16. For coordinating and guiding the activity of the county and communal commissions, there is formed, within the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives, the Central Commission of Agricultural Producers in Localities Without Cooperatives.

Article 17. The Central Commission of Agricultural Producers is composed of 61 members chosen, for a period of 5 years, by the conference of agricultural producers in localities without cooperatives.

The chairman of the Central Commission of Agricultural Producers in Localities Without Cooperatives is the deputy minister of agriculture and the food industry who coordinates and is responsible for the activity of animal husbandry.

The Central Commission of Agricultural Producers in Localities Without Cooperatives meets once per year and whenever necessary. The commission is convened by its executive bureau.

The central commission chooses the executive bureau, composed of 11 members. The chairman of the executive bureau is the chairman of the Central Commission of Agricultural Producers in Localities Without Cooperatives.

The executive bureau conducts the activity between the sessions of the central commission and implements its decisions.

Article 18. The central commission, the county commissions and the communal commissions of agricultural producers in localities without cooperatives promote advanced agricultural and zootechnical methods and initiate and organize actions for guiding, helping and mobilizing the agricultural producers to perform work of general interest, to utilize as fully as possible the production potential of the land, plantations and animals, to promote association in production, to increase the contribution to the state's central supply of products, and to raise the material and spiritual standard of living of agricultural producers in localities without cooperatives.

Article 19. The Congress of the Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, the Whole Peasantry and the Councils of Working People in the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management, the National Council for Agriculture, the Food Industry, Silviculture and Water Management, and the Central Commission of Agricultural Producers in Localities Without Cooperatives establish their operating regulations.

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